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家族所有權、經營權、控制權對集團企業經營績效與創新之影響 / The Research of How Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firms’ Performance and Innovation

從企業績效來看,在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的電子業,家族企業若聘用專業經理人經營,企業績效較差,反之,在產業技術變化性與風險較低的傳統產業,家族企業聘用專業經理人經營,反而企業績效較佳,這顯示,在面臨高度風險的環境時,家族企業中經營權與所有權的分離才會導致代理問題。同樣地,在電子業中,家族企業的控制權與所有權分離程度越高,企業績效越差,反之,在傳統產業中,家族企業控制權與所有權分離程度越高,企業績效反而越佳。這個結果顯示,在需持續創新、風險與產業技術複雜性較高的產業中,家族企業必須同時面臨兩種代理問題。
從企業對創新這類風險性投資的策略來看,本論文的研究結果顯示,經營權與所有權合一,企業所有者有能力及意願監督經營者,這將有助於企業投入較多的創新。反之,在控制權與所有權分離的情況下,因為投資的大部分是其他人的錢,企業的最終控制者能將創新的風險分散給外部股東,而較有意願投入創新。而家族控制者本身,因其規避風險的特質,而對上述兩類對創新有正向影響的治理機制有負向的調節效果(moderate)。但對家族成員而言,創新有助於企業的長期競爭優勢為了家族的永續發展,在經營企業上應該會採取長遠觀點(long-term perspective),而有意願投入創新,為了解開這個難題,本研究進一步將創新分為利用型創新(exploitative innovation)及開創型創新(explorative innovation)兩類,分析結果發現,家族企業雖然投入創新的數目較少,但在比例上有較多是較開創的創新,這個結果顯示,家族企業雖然害怕風險,但相對於非家族企業仍較具有長期經營的觀點並較具開創性。 / This dissertation concerns the effects of different governance structures on firms’ performance and innovativeness in business groups.
In the first study, the ambivalent needs of control and growth of family firms in business group are explored. This study finds that in general, the excess control rights and controlling shareholdings will increase firms’ performance. In addition, family firms with such control structures will perform better in non-electronic industry while worse in electronic industry. Lastly, active control, namely family members control management and chairman at the same time, will perform better in electronic industry while worse in non-electronic industry.
The second study focuses on comparing family and non-family group affiliated firms’ incentives to do innovations in different governance structures. Adopting behavior agent model, we propose that although family group affiliated firms are less innovativeness than non-family group affiliated firms in general, they have larger share of exploratory innovation than non-family firms. The empirical results support our hypotheses. However, in contrast to traditional agency perspective, the separations between ownership and control rights facilitate firms’ innovativeness. This finding may originate in pyramid ownership structure.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0953595041
Creators莊皓鈞, Chuang, Hao Jun
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language英文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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