隨著公司治理議題逐漸受到注意，我國政府制定了許多相關規範以使董事會對於公司管理者的監督功能健全。故本研究希望能藉由股票市場對於公司宣告總經理更換之反應，了解董事會是否發揮監督功能，撤換管理表現不佳的總經理。
本研究以2007年至2011年於證交所公開資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告專區宣告更換總經理之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，透過事件研究法計算個別公司更換總經理的宣告效果。
本研究首先探討市場對公司更換總經理之整體看法為何，再透過複迴歸分析進一步探討更換總經理前公司經營績效的好壞、卸任總經理之在位期間長短、卸任總經理是否離開公司、卸任總經理之持股百分比、董監事持股百分比、獨立董事人數占董事總人數之百分比等因素對宣告效果的影響。
實證結果有以下發現：(一) 更換前公司營運績效好壞對宣告效果有顯著的影響。更換前營運績效佳之公司有負面的宣告效果，更換前營運績效差之公司有正面的宣告效果。(二)更換前營運績效佳的公司，若卸任的總經理在位期間越長，則宣告效果越負面。(三)更換前營運績效差的公司，若卸任的總經理離開公司，則宣告效果比卸任的總經理沒有離開公司還要正面。(四)更換前營運績效差的公司，若原總經理持股百分比越高，則宣告效果越正面。表示對於這些總經理持股百分比高的公司而言，造成公司績效不佳的原因是總經理能力不足，而不是因為存在代理問題。(五)董監事持股百分比對更換總經理的宣告效果沒有顯著的影響。(六)獨立董事占公司董事總人數之百分比越高卻使更換總經理之宣告效果越負面，表示本研究之實證結果不支持獨立董事對更換總經理有正面的影響。 / This research studies the announcement effects of CEO turnovers with a view to understanding the reactions of stocks market toward CEO turnovers, and whether the boards play their role to oversee managers and replace those managers who perform poorly.
This research collected samples from Taiwan listed companies who announced CEO turnovers during year 2007 through year 2011 and then calculated announcement effects by event study method.
This research first studied the overall viewpoint of the stock market to CEO turnovers and then tried to figure out whether and how corporate operating performance before CEO turnovers, tenure of ex-CEO, whether the ex-CEO leaves the corporate, stock holding percentage of ex-CEO, stock holding percentage of directors and the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for total number of directors influence the announcement effects of CEO turnovers.
This research finds that: (1) Companies’ performances before CEO turnover significantly influence the announcement effects. Sub-sample of well-performed companies has negative announcement effects and the sub-sample of poorly-performed companies has positive announcement effects. (2) For well-performed companies, the longer the tenure of ex-CEO, the more negative the announcement effect is. (3) For poor-performed companies, the announcement effect of companies whose ex-CEO leaves the company is more positive than those whose ex-CEO does not leave the companies. (4) For poorly-performed companies, the higher the ex-CEO stock holding percentage, the more positive the announcement effect is. It means that for those companies whose ex-CEO stock holding percentage is high, it is not agency problem that causes CEO to perform poorly but the lack of the CEO’s ability does. (5) The stock holding percentage of directors does not significantly influence the announcement effect. (6) The higher the percentage of number of independent directors accounts for the total number of directors, the more negative the CEO turnover announcement effect is. This means that the result of this research does not support that independent directors have a positive impact on CEO turnover.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0101357019 |
| Creators | 許可姍 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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