本研究以民國91年至97年私募增資之上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，探討私募折價幅度與自我利益及公司治理之關連。
研究結果發現，私募期間過長或私募比例越高，則折價幅度越大，此外當應募人為公司內部人，且私募期間過長，其折價幅度越嚴重。顯示若私募期間過於冗長，則有心人士從中操控股價，套利的空間及能力越大，特別是公司內部人基於資訊的優勢，圖利自我的能力會較其他類型之應募人強。若再輔以大量的私募股份，即可從其他股東竊取大量的資產，對小股東傷害甚深。
有關公司治理方面，董(監)持股比例越高，則折價幅度越大；設有獨立外部董(監)事之公司，其折價幅度較小；而控制股東擔任董(監)事席次的比例與折價幅度則呈反向關係。顯示相較之下，外部獨立董(監)事是較佳的公司治理機制，能夠有效保障小股東之權益。 / This study examines the effects of self-dealing and corporate governance on price discount in private placement. Three main findings are as follows. The volume of private equity offering and the offering duration are both positively associated with price discount. When private equity is offered to insiders with long duration, it creates a compound effect, thus making price even lower. However, the existence of independent directors or supervisors is negatively associated with price discount.
The evidence shows that regulations on corporate governance could lessen self-dealing and board with independent directors or supervisors provides a better corporate governance mechanism on pricing in private placement to protect shareholders’ interest.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0096353023 |
| Creators | 劉家琳 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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