本研究以民國91年至97年私募增資之上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，探討私募折價幅度與自我利益及公司治理之關連。 研究結果發現，私募期間過長或私募比例越高，則折價幅度越大，此外當應募人為公司內部人，且私募期間過長，其折價幅度越嚴重。顯示若私募期間過於冗長，則有心人士從中操控股價，套利的空間及能力越大，特別是公司內部人基於資訊的優勢，圖利自我的能力會較其他類型之應募人強。若再輔以大量的私募股份，即可從其他股東竊取大量的資產，對小股東傷害甚深。 有關公司治理方面，董(監)持股比例越高，則折價幅度越大；設有獨立外部董(監)事之公司，其折價幅度較小；而控制股東擔任董(監)事席次的比例與折價幅度則呈反向關係。顯示相較之下，外部獨立董(監)事是較佳的公司治理機制，能夠有效保障小股東之權益。 / This study examines the effects of self-dealing and corporate governance on price discount in private placement. Three main findings are as follows. The volume of private equity offering and the offering duration are both positively associated with price discount. When private equity is offered to insiders with long duration, it creates a compound effect, thus making price even lower. However, the existence of independent directors or supervisors is negatively associated with price discount. The evidence shows that regulations on corporate governance could lessen self-dealing and board with independent directors or supervisors provides a better corporate governance mechanism on pricing in private placement to protect shareholders’ interest.

過去有關集團企業之研究，多偏重在探討集團企業多角化與績效之間的關係，而本研究嘗試以新的觀點，探討在資訊不對稱下集團企業所帶來的好處。 本研究提出若IPO的公司隸屬於集團企業，可降低承銷商與投資人的風險，使得IPO股票折價幅度降低之假設，並由台灣證券交易所網站，選取民國90年1月至民國98年12月底為止在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市之139家新上市公司為樣本，以做為分析之用。 根據本研究實證結果，在控制公司規模、漲跌幅新舊制、產業類別、與成立年數等變數下，當上市公司隸屬於集團企業時，相較於非集團企業之上市公司，其折價幅度平均低了8.777%。 而在把「電子業樣本」與「非電子業樣本」分開討論下，「電子業樣本」中，當上市公司隸屬於集團企業時，相較於非集團企業之上市公司，其折價幅度平均只低了1.055%；而「非電子業樣本」中，當上市公司隸屬於集團企業時，相較於非集團企業之上市公司，其折價幅度平均低了25.096%。

本研究以2002年至2010年4底前辦理私募增資之上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，探討公司財務特性對私募折價幅度之影響。研究結果顯示， 私募金額占公司市值比例與無形資產價值愈高，象徵公司價值的衡量愈複雜，私募應募人在衡量私募公司價值時需付出的較高成本，折價幅度將較高。再者，當私募目的指出私募公司有新的投資機會時，私募之折價幅度將較小；另外，私募公司股東權益報酬率愈高，代表私募公司利用現有資源效率較高，折價幅度愈低；而私募公司負債對股東權益比愈大，其長期償債能力較差，營運風險也會提升，所以應募人會要求較高折價幅度以補償此風險；當私募公司有發生財務危機可能時，應募人也會要求較高折價補償其所承受之風險。因此，私募折價幅度與公司資訊成本、投資機會及營運風險程度有密切關聯。 / This study examines the effects of financial characteristics on price discounts in private placement. Based on the Market Observation Post System, the sample includes private placements of all listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 2002 to April of 2010. The empirical evidence shows that discounts will be larger when private placement size is large relative to firm size. Intangible assets are difficult to value and therefore private placement investors will require larger discounts as compensation. If the issuer’s purposes of private placement indicate the availability of positive NPV investment opportunity to the firm then the discount will be smaller. In addition, the ROE variable has significant and negative association with discounts. This is consistent with the expectation that investors will assess the quality of the firm’s existing assets to form an opinion on risk and expected return of their private equity investment. On the other hand, high debt levels as measured by debt to equity result in higher discounts. Moreover, the existence of financial crisis is positively associated with discounts. In a word, the size of the discount to current market price is strongly related to proxies for the quality of the firm’s financial characteristics, future prospects and risk.