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經理人薪酬及其避險行為 / Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior

本研究探討經理人的風險承擔誘因與公司非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品使用之關聯性。研究結果發現,第一,經理人之風險承擔誘因與非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品的使用呈顯著負向關係,此結果顯示以股權為基礎之薪酬結構的確可以提高經理人之風險承擔誘因。第二,本研究比較若採不同類型之員工認股權,則指數型員工認股權較傳統型員工認股權提供較大的經理人風險承擔誘因。第三,若將股權為基礎之薪酬分為股票及員工認股權,發現經理人持有員工認股權與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向且顯著關係;而經理人持有公司股票則與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向關係但並不顯著。 / This study examines the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. First, executives’ risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, the result is consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0098352502
Creators黃怡婷, Huang, Yi Ting
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language英文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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