自願性財務預測對公司來說，是傳遞內部資訊給外部使用者之方法之一，透過自願性財務預測，藉以消弭因資訊不對稱所產生之代理問題。公司為了減輕代理問題，透過薪酬之設計，使經營者與股東之目標趨於一致，因此，本研究欲探討高階經理人之薪酬，是否會受到其自願性財務預測之影響。 本研究針對2000年至2009年標準普爾前五百(S&P 500)之公司，進行高階經理人薪酬及自願性財務預測關聯性之探討。以是否發佈自願性財務預測、是否未達成自願性財務預測，以及自願性財務預測之準確性，分別探討其與高階經理人薪酬之關聯。實證結果發現，公司當年度有發佈自願性年盈餘預測，高階經理人薪酬變動會增加；本研究亦發現當未達到自願性年盈餘預測時，高階經理人薪酬有負向變動，而未達到季盈餘預測的情況下並未發現同樣結果；而預測之準確性，不論是年樣本或季樣本，皆未發現與高階經理人薪酬有顯著之關聯性。 關鍵

本研究主要在探究專利權對於高階經理人薪酬制度之影響，並提出以下之假說：(1)專利權與高階經理人之現金薪酬有正向關係；(2)專利權與高階經理人之年度股票薪酬有正向關係；(3)專利權與高階經理人之年度總薪酬有正向關係；(4)專利權與高階經理人之股票薪酬所佔總薪酬比例有正向關係。 本文以美國製造業的高階經理人薪酬為樣本，經實證結果發現，專利權申請數、股東權益報酬率及股票報酬率對於高階經理人，無論是在現金薪酬或股票薪酬制度下，皆有顯著正向影響，此正說明在製造業的公司中，專利權對高階經理人薪酬是很重要的非財務性指標。並且，專利權亦與股票薪酬所佔總薪酬之比有顯著正向相關，也顯示有專利權的公司在對經理人的薪酬上較為偏好使用股票薪酬。 / The research is to explore the association between patent count and top management remuneration system. I hypothesize that : (1) CEO cash compensation is positively associated with patent count; (2) patent count and CEO annual stocks compensation have a positive relationship; (3) patent count is positively associated with CEO total annual pay; (4) The proportion of stock compensation in CEO pay is positively associated with patent count. Using a sample of manufacturing firms I document that patent count is positively associated with CEO compensation, consistent with my hypotheses. I also find strong evidence that patent count impacts the proportion of stock compensation in CEO pay. Overall, these findings suggest that patent count is an important non-financial indicator in CEO compensation.

本研究主要探討，企業社會責任這個議題，是否能跳脫傳統從企業道德﹝business ethics﹞的角度，以更實用性的思考，結合企業所最為關心的經濟利益考量，成功地說服企業用更主動積極的方式從事與企業社會責任相關的決策與投資活動。為了達成該研究目的，本研究採用由道瓊永續性北美指數2005-2007連續三年評選入榜的企業為研究標的，觀測其財務績效相關指標是否明顯優於其餘未入榜的企業。而在現今許多所有權與經營權分離的企業當中，如何成功地降低待理問題，使高階經理人能將組織長遠永續發展的目標結合自身利益，為股東與其他利害關係人帶來最大的利益是本研究第二個探討的議題。藉由分析S&P execucomp資料庫2005-2007年的資料，本研究從高階經理人的年度薪酬資料，去了解企業社會責任執行佳的企業是否在薪酬結構的設計上有不同的設計。資料分析結果顯示，連續三年評選進入道瓊永續性北美指數的企業，其公司成長性顯著優於未入榜的企業；而主要與企業短期績效表現連動的薪酬制度──紅利，其所佔比例越高，將誘使高階經理人挪用於其他能創造短期財務績效的投資活動，長遠來看，將不利於公司企業社會責任活動的執行與發展。 / The goal of this study is to examine whether business performance is affected by the adoption of practice included under the term of “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).”To achieve this goal, the relation between CSR and some accounting or market indicators are analyzed and the existence of significant difference in performance indicators between North American firms that have adopt CSR and others that have not is also examined. Besides, this study takes a further step to explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives. The Dow Jones Sustainability Index- North America is used for distinguishing firms that constantly comply with CSR practice for 3 years (2005-2007) from the rest. Empirical analysis supports the conclusion that differences in performance exist between firms that belong to the DJSI-North America (doing CSR good) and the rest (not doing CSR good). Moreover, the bonus of executive compensation has significant negative relationship with CSR. This finding implies that the compensation linking to short-term performance provides no incentives to executives for doing CSR which has long-term benefit for firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms.

本研究探討經理人的風險承擔誘因與公司非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品使用之關聯性。研究結果發現，第一，經理人之風險承擔誘因與非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品的使用呈顯著負向關係，此結果顯示以股權為基礎之薪酬結構的確可以提高經理人之風險承擔誘因。第二，本研究比較若採不同類型之員工認股權，則指數型員工認股權較傳統型員工認股權提供較大的經理人風險承擔誘因。第三，若將股權為基礎之薪酬分為股票及員工認股權，發現經理人持有員工認股權與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向且顯著關係；而經理人持有公司股票則與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向關係但並不顯著。 / This study examines the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. First, executives’ risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, the result is consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.

Bhattacharyya（2007）建立一個連結企業管理階層薪酬與現金股利的模型。該模型指出在既定的可用現金下，企業管理階層薪酬與現金股利支付率呈負相關。本研究參考上述模型，以2005年至2008年國內上市櫃公司資料為樣本，使用Tobit模型檢視樣本公司高階經理人薪酬、董監事薪酬與現金股利支付率之關聯性。本研究實證結果符合上述模型之推論，亦即高階經理人總薪酬與公司之現金股利支付率呈顯著負相關。 　　本研究另將高階經理人薪酬區分為現金薪酬與股票薪酬，進行額外的分析，其結果顯示高階經理人之股票薪酬與公司現金股利支付率呈顯著負相關。換言之，台灣上市櫃公司（尤其高科技產業）常使用之股票薪酬合約，其性質具有長期激勵之效果。在公司既定的可用現金下，此種合約不但可激勵高品質的高階經理人選擇淨現值為正的投資方案，且可確保經理人不因短期投資方案而犧牲公司的長期利益。 / Bhattacharyya (2007) proposed a dividend payout model in which executive compensation is associated with the level of cash dividends. The model shows that for a given level of cash available for distribution, there is a negative　relationship between a company’s dividend payout ratio and its managerial compensation. This study applies the above model to a sample of the listed companies at the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) from 2005 to 2008. The Tobit regression results are consistent with the Bhattacharyya (2007) model’s prediction, i.e., the dividend payout ratios of sample firms have negative associations with their managerial compensations. 　　In addition, this study classifies executive compensation into cash and stock payments for further analyses. The results show that dividend payout ratio is negatively correlated only with the stock portion of executive compensation. It means that for a given level of available cash for distribution, the nature of stock compensation has the long term effects which not only encourage a company’s executives to invest more in the projects with positive NPV without sacrificing the company’s benefits, bus also leave less cash for　distribution as dividends.