本研究旨在探討公司規模及產業競爭對CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬敏感性之影響。根據Leone et al. (2006)之研究，認為依未實現利得而給付之現金薪酬將產生事後交割成本，未實現損失可能遞延CEO之決策責任。由於未實現損益可反映至股票報酬上，因此有效率的現金薪酬契約對含有未實現利得之正股票報酬的敏感性低於含有未實現損失之負股票報酬，顯示現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬之敏感性呈現不對稱關係。本研究以此文獻作延伸，探究CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬之敏感關聯性及其不對稱性關係是否受公司規模與產業競爭之影響。 以ExecuComp資料庫2000年至2009年的CEO現金薪酬樣本進行迴歸分析，結果發現公司規模愈大，現金薪酬對市場績效之敏感性愈大，顯示為避免CEO從事會計盈餘管理，公司現金薪酬之給付更著重於市場績效之衡量；產業競爭方面，產業競爭愈激烈，現金薪酬與市場績效之敏感性愈小，符合風險差異化假說。關於CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱關係，實證結果顯示大規模公司及產業競爭程度較高者對CEO決策之審慎性更加要求，因此CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬敏感性之不對稱的差距愈大。 / This study investigates the effect of firm size and industry competition on the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to the stock returns. Leone et al. (2006) shows that since stock returns include both unrealized gains and losses, cash compensation would be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contains unrealized gains (positive returns) than when returns contain unrealized losses (negative returns). As an extension, this study examines whether firm size and industry competition affect the sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance and the asymmetry of sensitivity of cash compensation to stock returns. Based on the CEO cash compensation during 2000 and 2009 from ExecuComp database, the empirical results show that the firm size has positive effect on sensitivity of cash compensation to market performance while the industry competition has negative effect. Moreover, the asymmetry of sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns increases as firm size and industry competition increase.

Bhattacharyya（2007）建立一個連結企業管理階層薪酬與現金股利的模型。該模型指出在既定的可用現金下，企業管理階層薪酬與現金股利支付率呈負相關。本研究參考上述模型，以2005年至2008年國內上市櫃公司資料為樣本，使用Tobit模型檢視樣本公司高階經理人薪酬、董監事薪酬與現金股利支付率之關聯性。本研究實證結果符合上述模型之推論，亦即高階經理人總薪酬與公司之現金股利支付率呈顯著負相關。 　　本研究另將高階經理人薪酬區分為現金薪酬與股票薪酬，進行額外的分析，其結果顯示高階經理人之股票薪酬與公司現金股利支付率呈顯著負相關。換言之，台灣上市櫃公司（尤其高科技產業）常使用之股票薪酬合約，其性質具有長期激勵之效果。在公司既定的可用現金下，此種合約不但可激勵高品質的高階經理人選擇淨現值為正的投資方案，且可確保經理人不因短期投資方案而犧牲公司的長期利益。 / Bhattacharyya (2007) proposed a dividend payout model in which executive compensation is associated with the level of cash dividends. The model shows that for a given level of cash available for distribution, there is a negative　relationship between a company’s dividend payout ratio and its managerial compensation. This study applies the above model to a sample of the listed companies at the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Gre Tai Securities Market (GTSM) from 2005 to 2008. The Tobit regression results are consistent with the Bhattacharyya (2007) model’s prediction, i.e., the dividend payout ratios of sample firms have negative associations with their managerial compensations. 　　In addition, this study classifies executive compensation into cash and stock payments for further analyses. The results show that dividend payout ratio is negatively correlated only with the stock portion of executive compensation. It means that for a given level of available cash for distribution, the nature of stock compensation has the long term effects which not only encourage a company’s executives to invest more in the projects with positive NPV without sacrificing the company’s benefits, bus also leave less cash for　distribution as dividends.