This thesis examines the claims that philosophy can provide the foundation for science, that philosophy can show the presuppositions of science to be necessary, and that philosophy itself is presuppositionless. The investigation begins by considering Husserl's attempt to provide such a foundation - in particular, to show that it is pure logic that grounds science. It is in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic that Husserl develops this argument, through a sustained attack upon psychologism (the view that psychology grounds logic). By considering this attack in detail we attempt to demonstrate the emergence of certain limitations in the beginnings of Husserl's own views as to the nature of science, logic and truth. It is argued that these limitations entail the failure of the Husserlian project. A resolution of these limitations is developed through a consideration of the phenomenology of Hegel, and his arguments concerning the way philosophy should begin if it is to yield truth. In particular, Hegel's arguments for the necessity of phenomenology as preceding all other philosophy and providing the complete justification for science, for his particular conception of science, and for the nature of experience as being dialectical are examined. It is argued that these arguments enable science to be properly grounded. The final section of this thesis briefly reconsiders the Husserlian position in the light of the Hegelian position adopted.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:660014 |
| Date | January 1979 |
| Creators | Ninnes, L. E. |
| Publisher | University of Edinburgh |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://hdl.handle.net/1842/18495 |
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