In this thesis, I argue for the viability of Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of world-views as a form of meta-philosophy by defending its response to the challenge of history that arose in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. I show that Dilthey’s account of philosophy as a universal activity that is rooted in our psychological need for stability successfully integrates history’s insight into the contingency and plurality of philosophical systems without abandoning their truthfulness or tradition. To demonstrate and qualify the success of Dilthey’s theory, I apply it to Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus which I argue fails to sufficiently address its own historical contingency when it presents its account of and response to the problem of absurdity as a descriptive fact of critical consciousness. I show that Dilthey’s concept of reflective historical consciousness has the necessary resources to overcome Camus’ lack of reflection upon historical contingency. I argue further that Camus’ work reveals the inadequacy of Dilthey’s typology of philosophical world-views by resisting classification by its categories. My thesis therefore contributes to contemporary work on meta-philosophy by showing that Dilthey’s theory of world-views, while limited by its typologies, offers its history of philosophy as a viable form of meta-philosophy. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In this thesis, I aim to clarify how philosophy should attune itself to historical knowledge by analyzing Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of world-views. More specifically, I aim to investigate the utility of Dilthey’s theory as a response to history’s insight into the contingent nature of philosophy. I argue that Dilthey’s view of philosophy as a natural extension of our psychological need for stability is capable of accounting for the contingency and plurality of philosophical systems without sacrificing philosophy’s claim to a unique and universal essence. To support my argument, I use Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus as a characteristic case of philosophy failing to incorporate historical knowledge and show that Dilthey’s theory can overcome this failure through its account of reflective historical consciousness.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/28973 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | Noonan, Austin |
| Contributors | Steizinger, Johannes, Allen, Barry, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.0021 seconds