This dissertation analyzes the shape and scope of the virtuous life as it is made possible by and oriented toward God in the thought of two of the most consequential philosophical and theological thinkers in Christianity and Islam, Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), respectively. My analysis reveals that they share a commitment to the importance and reality of divine agency in shaping human moral action but sharply diverge in their vision of what constitutes a good human life. I argue that attending to these convergences and divergences in their ethics presents contemporary scholars and practitioners with a wide set of resources to theorize or navigate questions and challenges related to loving God, living well, and making moral decisions.
This dissertation is a work of comparative theological ethics and engages in historical and rational reconstruction alike. I analyze Aquinas’s and al-Ghazālī’s central arguments on their own terms before extending them into contemporary conversations about divine agency, human happiness, and love. I clarify ongoing disputes about virtue in Aquinas scholarship by arguing for the compatibility of the acquired and infused moral virtues through a more robust appreciation of his account of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes. I also contribute to burgeoning analyses of al-Ghazālī’s neglected account of virtue by arguing that his varied use of terms like good character traits (khulq), states of the soul (aḥwāl), and stations (maqāmāt) are united by his commitments to habituation and to his conception of happiness as grounded in the love of God alone.
I argue that al-Ghazālī’s insights regarding eternal happiness can inform ongoing debates about the compatibility of acquired and infused moral virtues in Aquinas scholarship and can help Christian theologians and practitioners better appreciate the necessity of the presence of both kinds of virtue in the Christian moral life. I utilize Aquinas’s well-developed account of the infused theological virtue of charity (caritas) to illumine al-Ghazālī’s station of love (maḥabba) as a virtuous activity that can structure a moral way of life oriented toward the end of knowing and loving God. Aside from its contributions to our understanding of these figures and these dimensions of moral thought and life, this dissertation also demonstrates the value of comparison more generally as a tool to clarify debated and neglected concepts in moral philosophy and theology, to enrich ethical deliberation, and to deepen love of God and neighbor. / 2026-05-16T00:00:00Z
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bu.edu/oai:open.bu.edu:2144/48771 |
| Date | 16 May 2024 |
| Creators | Heidelberger, Kathryn Lee |
| Contributors | Decosimo, David |
| Source Sets | Boston University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis/Dissertation |
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