1. Aim of the Thesis. This thesis is concerned to investigate the schemata of metaphysical concepts, and the lines of philosophical argument, used by Thomas Aquinas in reaching conclusions about the nature of the change through which Christ becomes present in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and about the nature of this continuing presence. Although the object to which the thesis relates is provided by doctrinal and theological affirmations, the perspective within which the investigation takes place is that of the reflective rationality distinctive of philosophy. Put differently, the aim of the thesis is to examine the speculative rational work undertaken by Thomas Aquinas in the course of his discussion of issues relating to the change of bread and of wine into the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist - a discussion that Thomas introduces by first arguing to traditional Catholic belief about the outcome of this change. The examination engages with the reasonable explanatory power of the conceptual resources and the philosophical arguments drawn upon by the Angelic Doctor in his systematic study of the Eucharistic change, and of the implications of this change relative to the continuing presence of Christ in the Eucharist. 2. Scope of the Thesis. The parameters of the thesis are set by St Thomas’s discussions of Eucharistic change and presence that take place in part three, questions 75-77, of his Summa Theologiae, book four, chapters 60-68, of his Summa contra Gentiles, and book four, distinctions 10-11, of his Scriptum super Libris Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Within these parameters are to be included contributions to the issues discussed by St Thomas made by Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Domingo Banez, and Silvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), major commentators on the work of Thomas. Extensive presentation, and scrutiny, of opposing arguments from Duns Scotus are also included. Following an introductory chapter concerned to situate, summarise, and indicate its principal assumptions, the thesis explores what is, for St Thomas, a major objection to affirming the substantially real presence of Christ in the Eucharist: such an affirmation is said to imply the ontological impossibility that Christ’s bodily reality is simultaneously present in more than one place. The response to this objection involves an analysis of the distinction between the primary and the secondary formal effects of dimensive quantity, and the use of this distinction to argue at some length that one and the same material thing may be simultaneously present in more than one place if the secondary formal effects of dimensive quantity that would spatially situate this thing in relation to its immediate surroundings are suspended. The thesis then considers three issues dealing with what becomes of the substance of the bread and of the wine at the Eucharistic consecration. In the first of these, Thomas rejects the claim that the substance of the bread and of the wine remains in existence on the altar, affirming that the bread and wine are changed at the level of substance into the body and blood of Christ. This position requires, and receives, sustained treatment of philosophical questions concerning ‘substance’, and change affecting the whole substance of a thing (within a hylomorphic understanding of material realities). Related problems of individuation, causal agency, and the logic of language that both signifies, and brings about, change, are considered. The second issue investigates the claim that the substance of the bread and of the wine is not changed after all into the body and blood of Christ but is either annihilated or changed into matter-in-an-earlier-state. This claim is rejected by St Thomas on philosophical grounds, and this section of the thesis engages critically with Cajetan on several points connected with Thomas’s arguments The third issue concerns, and affirms, the capacity of bread and wine to be changed substantially into the body and blood of Christ, at which point the thesis widens out to contrast a hylomorphic with a hylomeric account of matter, and to consider at some length Duns Scotus’s metaphysics of the Eucharist which oppose those of St Thomas. Chapter six of the thesis explores in some detail the responses of Cajetan and Ferrariensis to the challenges issued by Scotus, and the concluding chapter (chapter seven) provides an analysis of Thomistic ideas regarding three modes of the emergence of being: creation, natural change, transubstantiation. 3. Conclusions. The title asserts that the thesis is “an examination of the Thomistic metaphysics of the Eucharistic presence”. This examination endorses the following conclusions: 3.1 The schemata of metaphysical concepts employed by St Thomas (e.g. the concepts of substance, accident, esse, primary matter, substantial form, creation, natural change, obediential potentiality, primary/secondary formal effects of dimensive quantity), and his lines of philosophical argument, provide a clearly valid response to “the exigencies of the inquiring mind at work” in relation to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In other words, their reasonable explanatory power is evidently to be affirmed. 3.2 Pari passu the thesis indicates something of what could be called ‘the mystery of matter’ – the inexhaustible depths and potentialities of matter that the inquiring mind confronts when exploring matter in the distinctive situation that is matter’s special dependence on the First Cause in the Eucharistic change (transubstantiation). 3.3 The thesis is an instance of philosophical work undertaken in the first decade of the 21st century, and within the socio-cultural context of this time. This socio-cultural ‘situatedness’, although vastly different from the socio-cultural ‘situatedness’ of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Banez, has created no culturally relative barrier - no ‘incommensurability’ - such as to prevent an understanding of the conceptual/argumentative activity in which these thinkers engaged some centuries ago. Human beings always and everwhere ‘fit into’ the same Universe through their abiding and ineluctably shared openness to being and its first principles.

Thesis--Berlin, 1908.

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Thesis advisor: Thomas Groome / Western culture idealizes the quest for authenticity as a significant life project. This culture of authenticity is characterized by the understanding that it is important for each person to search for their unique life expression and purpose, even as larger social, political, religious, and other such frameworks are generally suspected of being in conflict with or in opposition to the truly authentic. Further, the forces of secularism and pluralism have allowed for a wide dissemination of varied and often conflicting views about what constitutes an authentic way of being in the world. Within such a secular-pluralistic milieu, the prevalence of different and often competing views is particularly acute in regards to contemporary images and concepts of God, particularly as these relate to the (post)modern quest for authenticity. For instance, while our culture's widespread suspicion that larger religious frameworks inhibit authenticity has in part led to a significant rise in the numbers of those unaffiliated with any religious tradition, a majority of the unaffiliated still claim to believe in God. This somewhat paradoxical phenomenon can be traced back to the secular-pluralist profusion of various understandings and expressions regarding the meaning of "God." Within these circumstances, "authentic" relation to the divine is often seen as a highly individualized and even subjective concern; as something having to do with what best expresses a person's own feelings and inner personal world regarding the unique meaning of their life. This dissertation posits that Catholic religious and theological education needs to take seriously the importance our culture accords to the quest for authenticity and to actively work against its individualistic, expressivist, and subjectivist tendencies. Unmasking the illusion that authenticity requires dismissing larger frameworks, such as religious tradition, I posit that it is only within larger frameworks that we are able to discern the more from the less authentic. In terms of images and conceptions of God then, I argue that a Catholic education for today requires retrieving the Catholic Intellectual Tradition's discipline of philosophical theology so as to provide students with the resources necessary for discerning the true, living God from among the jumble of ideas and images on offer within secular-pluralism. Ch. 1 provides an historical overview of the culture of authenticity and in the process defines the latter and its relation to secular-pluralism and to the proliferation of images and conceptions of God. Philosophical theology is introduced as potentially necessary component of a Catholic education that seeks to help students discern the authentic, or true God. Ch. 2 takes up the question of authenticity as related to conflicting ideas about the truth of existence and in this light offers an understanding of truth as engaged, relational, and non-absolute. This understanding grounds the contemporary philosophical theological approach presented in chapters four and five. First, however, Ch. 3 looks at the thought of Thomas Aquinas as standard for the field of philosophical theology and therefore as necessary for (creatively) retrieving for its usefulness today. Chapter 4 begins the process of retrieval by outlining the ways in which W. Norris Clarke's Thomistically based "Inner" and "Outer" Paths to God provide elements for a contemporary philosophical theology. Ch. 5 continues in this vein as it turns to the work of Elizabeth Johnson to elucidate the socioeconomic, political, and cultural aspects that must be attended to by any contemporary philosophical theology. Ch. 6 proposes Thomas Groome's Shared Christian Praxis approach to Christian religious education as theoretically and practically compatible with a contemporary philosophical theology and therefore as the most suitable pedagogical approach to educating from and for faith. I conclude the dissertation with a brief reflection on what lessons philosophical theology has to offer to Catholic religious and theological education as a whole. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry.

<p>As Christians in the United States struggle to sustain hope in the face of global economic, environmental, military, and poverty crises, the most popular source of theological hope for preachers and congregations is that of Jürgen Moltmann and the Moltmannian hope that draws on his work. Moltmannian theology eschews close connections with more-canonically established doctrines of hope, claiming instead on a future-based, this-worldly eschatology that hopes in the God who suffers. An exclusive reliance on a Moltmannian theology of hope deprives the church of crucial resources for a robust eschatological hope and its practices. Critical attention to additional streams of of theologial hope, and to applicable discourses within and without Christian theology, provides the church with strength and resilience to sustain a distinctly Christian theological hope through and beyond disaster, despair, suffering, and death. Jesus Christ, the perfect hope, embodies the life -- earthly and eternal -- of humanity and its eschatological end, a life in which humans can participate, through grace and discipleship.</p><p> To make this argument, I survey characteristics of Moltmannian hope and then identify costs of a theological hope that relies exclusively on Moltmannia resources. I review a Patristic and Thomistic grammar of theological hope and its accompanying grammar of God; and I explore possible contributions to theological hope from an assortment of contemporary conversations outside conventionally-identified areas of Christian hope. I conclude with two suggestions for ecclesial formation of Christians in theological hope.</p> / Dissertation

Some comparative studies of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas put emphasis on the similarities between Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics. In this study, however, I have attempted to show a salient difference; a respect in which Thomas's system cannot accommodate certain Aristotelian tenets. I have argued that, although Thomas tries to incorporate Aristotle's account of intellection, he cannot consistently do so. For an integration of this sort entails that the created intellect is identical with God when it contemplates him. This, however, is a conclusion that would rightly be rejected as metaphysically implausible in Thomas's system. Aristotle's view of intellection entails that the intellect is identical with whatever it contemplates when that object possesses no matter. For, intellection, which is itself immaterial, assumes the form of whatever it contemplates, and furthermore, matter is what individuates distinct entities that share the same form. If all this is so, then the human intellect becomes identical with Aristotle's god when it contemplates him. In Aristotle's system, this would not present any problems, for a very interesting reason: Aristotle, on an interpretation of his thought that seems textually plausible, teaches that part of the human mind is identical with divine intellect, or nous; that this part is "implanted" in the human being "from outside" and is the most divine part?and so, part of the human being can rightly be said to be eternal.1 Thomas, however, in accordance with Christian doctrine, holds that the human intellect has its own created identity, and differs numerically from person to person. But Thomas's adoption of prominent theses from Aristotle's account of intellection unfortunately entails that the human intellect, in contemplatio, becomes identical with God, since God is immaterial and identical with his essence. After looking at some possible solutions, I argue that this is not a desirable outcome in Thomas's Christian metaphysic, for several good reasons.

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The opening chapter briefly introduces the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and the history of its appropriation into the systematic rational discourse of philosophy, as culminating in Thomas Aquinas’ account of transubstantiation with its metaphysical elaboration of the separability of accidents from their subject (a substance), so as to exist (supernaturally) without a subject. Chapter Two expounds St. Thomas’ account of the separability of accidents from their subject. It shows that Thomas presents a consistent rational articulation of his position throughout his works on the subject. Chapter Three expounds Dietrich of Freiberg’s rejection of Thomas’ view, examining in detail his treatise De accidentibus, which is expressly dedicated to demonstrating the utter impossibility of separate accidents. Especially in light of Kurt Flasch’s influential analysis of this work, which praises Dietrich for his superior level of ‘methodological consciousness,’ this chapter aims to be painstaking in its exposition and to comprehensively present Dietrich’s own views just as we find them, before taking up the task of critically assessing Dietrich’s position. Chapter Four critically analyses the competing doctrinal positions expounded in the preceding two chapters. It analyses the various elements of Dietrich’s case against Thomas and attempts to pinpoint wherein Thomas and Dietrich agree and wherein they part ways. It argues that Thomas’ arguments have a strength and consistency which Dietrich’s arguments clearly lack. Chapter Five applies the argumentative findings from Chapter Four to an assessment of the analyses found in recent philosophical literature of the dispute between Thomas and Dietrich. My analysis indicates that there are some serious and persistent deficiencies in these analyses – first, those treating Thomas’ position, and consequently those treating Dietrich’s – and offers some diagnosis of the root causes of these deficiencies. I conclude with remarks addressed to general doubts about the status of the question of the separability of accidents as an actual ‘philosophical’ question. Résumé: Le chapitre initial décrit brièvement la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie et l’histoire de l’appropriation de cette doctrine dans un cadre de discours systématiquement rationnel (c’est-à-dire, philosophique), terminant avec la doctrine de la transsubstantiation et l’élaboration métaphysique, tel que rendu par Thomas d’Aquin, de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet (une substance), c’est-à-dire, de la possibilité (surnaturelle) de l’existence des accidents sans aucun sujet. Le deuxième chapitre élabore l’explication de Thomas d’Aquin de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet. Est montré qu’au long de sa carrière Thomas n’a jamais basculé dans son articulation rationnelle de sa position. Au troisième chapitre est examiné le refus de la doctrine thomiste par Dietrich de Freiberg, surtout dans son traité De accidentibus, lequel se donne expressément à la démonstration de l’impossibilité absolue d’un accident séparé. En vue de l’analyse influent de Kurt Flasch, selon lequel Dietrich représente admirablement une ‘conscience de la méthode,’ ce chapitre vise à exposer soigneusement le progrès de l’argumentation du traité, tout juste comme le présente Dietrich, avant d’avancer à un analyse critique de sa position. Dans le quatrième chapitre sont soumises à l’analyse les positions rivales, celle de Thomas et celle de Dietrich. Les éléments du critique qu’apporte Dietrich contre Thomas sont examinés et l’analyse différencie les points d’accord et de désaccord entre les deux penseurs. Est démontré que l’argumentation de Thomas a une force et une consistance bien supérieure à celui de Dietrich. Dans le cinquième chapitre, sont appliquées les conclusions du quatrième chapitre à l’analyse de la littérature récente traitante de la dispute entre Thomas et Dietrich. Est montré que cette littérature comporte de graves méconnaissances de la position de Thomas, et aussi, en conséquence, de la critique de celle-ci apporté par Dietrich, et j’essaie d’élucider ce que sont les racines des inconséquences remarquées dans la littérature. Je termine en offrant quelques remarques qui s’addressent à certaines doutes générales concernant le vrai statut ‘philosophique’ de la question de la séparabilité des accidents.