This paper addresses the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness as interpreted by the fourteenth-century Tibetan Tsongkhapa. Tsongkhapa’s emptiness maintains that all phenomena are “empty” of intrinsic existence, an idea which starkly contrasts common Western worldviews that rely of belief in self-enclosed identities or souls. Here I analyze Tsongkhapa’s arguments for emptiness and relate them to the reader using examples easily understood by Western undergraduate students. I also provide several critiques of Tsongkhapa’s position and attempt to answer them according to his philosophy. This paper is aimed to be a simple, yet thorough introduction to Tsongkhapa’s philosophy of emptiness.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ETSU/oai:dc.etsu.edu:honors-1037 |
| Date | 05 May 2012 |
| Creators | Shelton, Jesse |
| Publisher | Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University |
| Source Sets | East Tennessee State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Undergraduate Honors Theses |
| Rights | Copyright by the authors., http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ |
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