Return to search

Exploring the limits of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments

In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide.
Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa.de:bsz:14-qucosa-147728
Date07 July 2014
CreatorsReinhardt, Markus
ContributorsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management,, Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura, Ph.D., Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura, Ph.D., Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer
PublisherSaechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden
Source SetsHochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typedoc-type:doctoralThesis
Formatapplication/pdf

Page generated in 0.002 seconds