An analysis of company law may allow us to abandon a perception that company law is impartial to the political context in which it is applied. This paper argues that state protectionism is reflected in the design of company law. Specifically, states may confer public functions to board of directors through their duties and authorities; in turn, directors’ functions may become barriers to foreign investments.
To illustrate this argument, focus is placed on the duties of Canadian corporate directors and how their functions affect foreign direct investment in Canada. It demonstrates that the public function conferred to corporate directors echoes the State’s policy and regulations governing foreign investment. As a consequence to the redundancy of the public interest rationalization and the lack of political will to affect real market openness, unnecessary barriers are being placed for market access which may ultimately render Canada less attractive for foreign investors.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/42830 |
| Date | 22 November 2013 |
| Creators | Elhakim, Hadir |
| Contributors | Iacobucci, Edward |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.0015 seconds