The main concern of the thesis is the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality and to investigate how Kant makes a room for freedom. Kant, firstly, in &ldquo / Analytic&rdquo / , constitutes the conditions of knowledge upon which the objective validity of the law of causality entirely rests. This process of constitution also determines the limits of experience. On the other hand, Kant, in &ldquo / Dialectic&rdquo / , postulates freedom as a noumenal cause together with the law of causality. Transcendental freedom, in this case, is a problematic concept which transcends the limits of experience, as it seems to destruct the unity of experience. However, Kant gives up neither the law of causality nor the idea of freedom, but rather he insists upon the idea that they can exist together without contradiction by asserting the distinction between phenomena and noumena as different grounds on which these two different types of causalities rest. According to Kant both are indispensable, as the former is necessary for the knowledge and the latter is absolutely needed for morality. In this context this thesis aims to explain the objective validity of natural causality which is proved in Second Analogy and the transcendental ground of the idea of freedom which is established in the solution of Third Antinomy in Kant&rsquo / s Critique of Pure Reason. And it is discussed whether Kant&rsquo / s solution of this issue is satisfactory and legitimate or not.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12606807/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 December 2005 |
| Creators | Ozdoyran, Guven |
| Contributors | Inam, Ahmet |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | M.A. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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