Canadian foreign policy towards Indonesia during the governments of Louis St. Laurent
(1948-57) and John Diefenbaker (1957-63) was conditioned by Canada's place in the North
Atlantic alliance, seen as more central to national interests. The most direct Canada-Indonesia
connections were forged by non-government "public diplomats." This thesis utilizes the theory of
"mental maps" as a way of understanding how diplomats imagined the world. Policymakers1
mental maps gave prominence to Europe and the North Atlantic. Southeast Asia appeared only as
a periphery needing to be held for larger "free world" goals. Ottawa viewed Indonesia through the
prism of its alliances and multilateral associations. Canadian diplomacy towards Indonesia was
often designed to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic alliance.
During the Indonesian national revolution, Canadian representatives on the Security Council
acted to help their Netherlands allies. They found a compromise solution that helped to prevent
splits within the North Atlantic alliance and the Commonwealth. Policymakers were working out
a diplomatic self-image: Canada as mediating middle power. This was a process of myth making
in which actions taken for alliance reasons were remembered as part of a global peacemaking
mission. However, Ottawa avoided involvement in the second Indonesian-Dutch decolonization
dispute over West New Guinea (Papua). Development aid also became part of Canada's
diplomatic self-perception. Canada sent aid through the Colombo plan, intended to restore global
trade and fight the cold war with non-military weapons. Canadian aid to Indonesia was negligible,
primarily wheat.
While bilateral relations were limited, non-state actors operating within North America-wide
networks forged more important connections. Canadian advisers to Indonesia's National Planning
Bureau mapped out a development path based on Western models. McGill University's Institute
of Islamic Studies promoted the "modernization" of Islam. Indonesia under Sukarno (1945-65)
tried to avoid dependence on aid, but welcomed investment by oil companies such as Asamera
and bought de Havilland aircraft from Canada. The seeds for the economic policies of Suharto's
New Order (1965-98) were sown during this period by Indonesians based in the Planning Bureau
and at McGill. Public diplomacy had a more enduring effect than government policy. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/17019 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Webster, David |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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