Yes / The issues of channel conflict and channel power have received widespread research attention, including Geylani et al.’s (2007) work on channel relations in an asymmetric retail setting. Specifically, these authors suggest that a manufacturer can respond to a dominant retailer’s pricing pressure by raising the wholesale price for a weak retailer over that for the dominant retailer while transferring demand to the weak retailer channel via cooperative advertising. But, is online expansion another kind of strategic manufacturer’s optimal response to a dominant retailer? In this paper, we extend this work by adding a direct online selling channel to illustrate the impact of the manufacturer’s internet entry on firms’ demands, profits, and pricing strategies and on consumer welfare. Our analysis thus includes a condition in which the manufacturer can add an online channel. If such an online channel is opened, the channel-supported network externality will always benefit the manufacturer but hurt the retailers. Consumers, however, will only benefit from the network externality when a dominant retailer is present and will be hurt when both retailers are symmetric. / National Natural Science Foundation of China, Chongqing’s Natural Science Foundation, British Academy
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BRADFORD/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/14046 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | He, R., Xiong, Y., Cheng, Y., Hou, Jiachen |
| Source Sets | Bradford Scholars |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, Accepted manuscript |
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