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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A study of the effect of the Robinson-Patman Act upon cooperative advertising policies and practices /

Davidson, John Robert January 1960 (has links)
No description available.
2

微分賽局在行銷通路之應用─合作廣告

余俊慶, Yu, Chung-Ching Unknown Date (has links)
在經濟活動發展迅速的情形下,產品的競爭與多樣化使得廠商在價格之外,也須將行銷策略納入考量。研究行銷通路中成員互動的理論模型從靜態模型開始,到用動態微分賽局的模型來研究廠商間的互動,過去的研究文獻得到了兩點結論:第一,通路合作為Pareto最適。第二,在通路無法合作的情況下,利用合作機制的建立,能使均衡結果產生Pareto改善。 然而,過去的文獻卻未說明將通路合作放入合作廣告的模型中,通路合作是否仍為Pareto最適。因此,本研究沿用Jørgensen et al.(2003)合作廣告模型的設定,將通路合作的情況放入模型中,比較通路合作、零售商遠視、零售商短視與合作廣告四種情形均衡時的行銷策略及廠商的利潤,並探討通路合作在合作廣告的模型中是否仍為Pareto最適。
3

Online expansion: is it another kind of strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer?

He, R., Xiong, Y., Cheng, Y., Hou, Jiachen January 2016 (has links)
Yes / The issues of channel conflict and channel power have received widespread research attention, including Geylani et al.’s (2007) work on channel relations in an asymmetric retail setting. Specifically, these authors suggest that a manufacturer can respond to a dominant retailer’s pricing pressure by raising the wholesale price for a weak retailer over that for the dominant retailer while transferring demand to the weak retailer channel via cooperative advertising. But, is online expansion another kind of strategic manufacturer’s optimal response to a dominant retailer? In this paper, we extend this work by adding a direct online selling channel to illustrate the impact of the manufacturer’s internet entry on firms’ demands, profits, and pricing strategies and on consumer welfare. Our analysis thus includes a condition in which the manufacturer can add an online channel. If such an online channel is opened, the channel-supported network externality will always benefit the manufacturer but hurt the retailers. Consumers, however, will only benefit from the network externality when a dominant retailer is present and will be hurt when both retailers are symmetric. / National Natural Science Foundation of China, Chongqing’s Natural Science Foundation, British Academy

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