In the first essay of this dissertation, I argue that much of the observed variation in national climate change mitigation levels can be explained by a combination of national interests and the strategic constraints of the collective action problem. Specifically, the interactions between state costs and benefits and state size, a proxy for invulnerability to free-riding, strongly predict observed variation in national yearly emissions. I derive this hypothesis and connect it to extant literature with a theoretical framework that interrelates state climate change mitigation interests, preferences, behaviors, and outcomes. I test the hypothesis by predicting the difference between real emissions changes and a novel estimate for counterfactual emissions changes. The theoretical framework and the counterfactual estimation methodology developed in this paper will facilitate future work on climate mitigation politics, from both international and domestic politics approaches.
In the second essay, I analyze the design of major climate change mitigation treaties, and outline how reliance on collective reciprocity undermines their ability to enforce participation and compliance. Collective reciprocity is limited in its ability to induce high cost actions among large numbers of states. I demonstrate this challenge with an empirical approach that first estimates treaty participation and then estimates compliance by comparing signatory emissions to a synthetic control that weights for both treatment propensity and pre-treatment trends. I find no evidence of success in climate treaties thus far, underlining the tensions in collective reciprocity designs and indicating the need for an alternative approach.
In the third essay, I develop a novel institutional theory of long-term environmental good provision, particularly forest conservation. Long-term goods, or those for which payoffs are delayed or spread over time, are more likely to be provided by states with long-term institutions, or those with low discount rates and inter-temporal commitment mechanisms. Leveraging recent institutional theories, I argue that party institutionalization lengthens institutional time horizons while constraints on the executive allows inter-temporal commitment. Both features therefore predict long-term environmental good provision. Environmental goods are frequently long term because feedback from ecological systems creates tipping points or vicious cycles, meaning that current actions may be costless today but contribute to significant damage in future periods. Understanding the implications of the inter-temporal nature of many environmental goods is especially important because a large share of environmental goods, such as forest conservation, are not explained by traditional approaches which focus on public goods models for symmetric and non-excludable goods. I test my theory with cross-national time-series data on forest coverage, demonstrating that forest protection is not predicted by public goods theory but is well predicted by long-term institutions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/es1h-jn91 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Houskeeper, Samuel James |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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