The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. Using a multi-stage extensive form game, I investigate how electoral competition interacts with diversions and policy distortions. My result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions but prompts the parties to divert more funds.
Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants' productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, only pooling PBE exists given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow a separating PBE to exist. We also study the case of three types and find different PBEs.
The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents' strategies. Suppose that the social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed Clarke mechanism is characterized by strategy-proofness and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the compensation scheme is fully funded with the tax revenue based on the benefits. We then use a simple example to show that a weighted version of the Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome. / Ph. D. / People worry that lobbying may affect legislative decision-making in ways that disadvantage ordinary citizens. The first chapter presents a theoretical model of electoral competition where two parties can increase campaign contributions by choosing policies benefiting a significant interest group. However, such decision will shrink their hardcore vote base where voters are well informed about the policy. The parties can then allocate the funds between campaigning and personal wealth. Different from the core voters, independent voters can be attracted by advertisements funded by campaign spending. The result shows that a higher level of electoral competition helps mitigate policy distortions, but prompts the parties to divert more funds.
Signaling games have been widely used for decades. Perfectly informed signal senders need to communicate their true type (productivity or ability) which is often private information to potential receivers. While tests are commonly used as measures of applicants’ productivity, the accuracy of them has been questioned. Beginning with the framework of a two-type labor market signaling game, the second chapter investigates how tests of limited reliability affect the nature of equilibria in signaling games with asymmetric information. Our results show that, if a test is inaccurate and costly, both high- and low-productivity workers voluntarily take the test given certain conditions. Different forms of test inaccuracy may allow the existence of a specific equilibrium where only high-productivity workers are willing to take the test. We also study the case of three types and find different types of equilibria.
The central issue of siting noxious facilities is that the host community absorbs potential costs, while all others can share the benefits without paying as much. The third chapter presents a modified Clarke mechanism to facilitate the siting decision, taking into account all residents’ strategies. Suppose that a social planner is able to reasonably estimate the possible costs, depending on the host location, to each resident created by the facility. Our proposed mechanism motivates all citizens to honestly report their preferences and yields an efficient siting outcome. The issue of budget imbalance is mitigated when the total cost, including the compensation scheme, is fully funded with tax revenues. We then use a simple example to show that a wealth-weighted version of our proposed Clarke mechanism may yield a different outcome.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/82963 |
| Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Creators | Yang, Tsung-Han |
| Contributors | Economics, Science, Tideman, Nicolaus, Bahel, Eric A., Smith, Alexander Charles, Ball, Sheryl B. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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