When faced with an emergency situation, politicians are often forced to sacrifice their core moral principles in order to better serve the immediate public interest. This is commonly described as the Dirty Hands dilemma. Dirty Hands theorists conditionally defend politicians, but they leave the dilemma under-defined. Realists think that politicians do not even need defence, but their approach is overly relativistic and fails to distinguish between moral and immoral exercises of political authority. The present study critically engages with both sides of the debate in two parts. First, I use the method of conceptual analysis — and specifically conceptual disambiguation — to find out how each side conceives of the nature of the Dirty Hands dilemma. I find that (1) the dilemma emerges when a politician is forced to disregard the core human rights of certain individuals or groups to safeguard similar rights of others, and (2) the Realists fail to distinguish the concept of Dirty Hands from the concept of Political Compromise and Dirty Hands dilemmas from ordinary moral dilemmas. Second, using the method of reflective equilibrium, I advance the normative judgement that, instead of expressing guilt and paying the price, politicians should commit to not making their actions easy precedents when they confront a Dirty Hands dilemma. This study offers a better theoretical understanding of the Dirty Hands dilemma and a practical approach to distinguishing between moral and immoral exercises of political authority.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-475948 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Dhar, Siddhartha Kumar |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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