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Insurance Market Equilibrium: Contract Formation, Heterogeneity, and Operational Efficiency

The three essays of this dissertation investigate the insurance equilibrium from various perspectives. The first essay uses Cournot game-theoretic model to study the insurance contract formation and provides theoretical justification for policy limit. The second essay introduces buyers' heterogeneous risk aversion into Wilson's equilibrium, derives new equilbria, and provides the conditions under which those new equilibria will hold. The third essay studies the operational efficiency of life insurers in China. Through comparing the efficiency of domestic and foreign life insurers, decomposing their efficiency scores, figuring out the directions and potential they could improve, and analyzing the change and driver of productivity, the essay gives insights of the fast-developing life insurance industry in China. / Business Administration

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:TEMPLE/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/3692
Date January 2008
CreatorsQiu, Shuo
ContributorsPowers, Michael R., Weiss, Mary A., Cummins, J. David, Mao, Connie X., Sarkar, S. K. (Sanat K.)
PublisherTemple University. Libraries
Source SetsTemple University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis/Dissertation, Text
Format82 pages
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Relationhttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3674, Theses and Dissertations

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