In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with<p>indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers.<p>Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between<p>them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this<p>influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the<p>Banzhaf index. This thesis develops models to measure the Banzhaf indices in any ownership structure (pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures). The models are then applied to real cases studies such Colruyt, Elia, Lafarge and Allianz. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209768 |
| Date | 13 January 2012 |
| Creators | Levy, Marc |
| Contributors | Szafarz, Ariane, Mareschal, Bertrand, Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, Crama, Yves, Chapelle, Ariane |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | French |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 1 v. (179 p.), No full-text files |
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