<p>During the last decades, legislators have tried to meet the goal of increased R&D in the pharmaceutical industry through an extension of the patent length. In parallel, an attempt to minimise ex post social costs has been made through the introduction of a shortened drug approval process for generic drugs as well as a so-called Bolar provision, giving generic producers earlier access to patented information. However, one can ask how efficient a patent extension possibility has been to meet the goal of increased R&D. Correspondingly, what effects on social costs can we expect from the introduction of an abbreviated approval process and the Bolar provision? These are questions that are dealt with in this thesis. I argue that the impact of the legislative changes have led to a decrease of ex post social cost. However, I will also show that this has lead to a detriment of ex ante R&D incentives and therefore a negative result on social welfare.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA/oai:DiVA.org:liu-2443 |
| Date | January 2004 |
| Creators | Zeitoun, Suzanna |
| Publisher | Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Ekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, text |
| Relation | Magisteruppsats från Internationella ekonomprogrammet, ; 2004:35 |
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