The Thesis was inspired by a perceived need better to understand the unique description
of unjust enrichment by the Australian courts, as a unifying legal concept. It
demonstrates that concepts and principles are essential features of the common law
because they identify the character and taxonomy of rules. The comparative study,
encompassing Australian and English law primarily, and law of other jurisdictions,
modern and ancient, elucidates the special characteristics of the concepts and principles
of Anglo/Australian unjust enrichment and of concepts and principles generally.
A like concept has had a place in the common law since its inception under several
characterisations. It bears the mark of ancient Roman jurisprudence, but relates to
independent principles. The jurisprudence was formed by special characteristics of its
history. It is distinct from modern Roman/Dutch law but the doctrinal overtones of its
foundational case law reflect the basis of reasoning which in Continental law, is found in the adopted ancient codes. It is this foundation of reasoning and the firm rejection of a normative general principle that makes Anglo/Australian law different in character and jurisprudence from unjust enrichment in USA and Canada.
Stifled for centuries by quasi contract misconceptions, the law of unjust enrichment entered the modern law in the 20th C through the seminal judgements of Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd, and related cases and through the strong judicial and juristic following they inspired. That
any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for
unjust enrichment
became an imperative across the common law world: it has long held a place in the Roman Dutch jurisdictions of South Africa and Continental Europe.
The special character of unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian law is focussed upon a unique action where-by the law imposes an obligation upon the establishment of a recognised ground. The notion of breach of a primary rule does not arise: the obligation is therefore a primary obligation imposed by law, as distinct from a remedy for a breach. Important consequences flow from the characteristic.
The juristic development of unjust enrichment in the common law has long been the sole prerogative of the superior courts. The place of historical features of the jurisprudence has however been subsumed by modern judicial methodology that is slowly assuming a unifying pattern of reasoning from case to case; from one ground to another. This is the special characteristic of the unifying legal concept and English principle of unjust enrichment.
The thesis draws widely based conclusions about concepts and principles of unjust enrichment and the actions and obligations they sponsor. It portrays them as the substance of legal reasoning and analyses underlying theory. to this end, it addresses counter juristic and historical arguments. Its central conclusion are that there are sound jurisprudential arguments for actions based upon a unifying legal concept and English principle of unjust enrichment, and that the explanation of the unjust enrichment concept as the foundation of an independent branch of the common law and taxonomy is theoretically sustainable. In this manner concepts and principles of the common law are demonstrated as critical characteristics of the common law at large.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/217196 |
| Date | January 2004 |
| Creators | Donnelly, John Bede, mikewood@deakin.edu.au |
| Publisher | Deakin University. School of Law |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | http://www.deakin.edu.au/disclaimer.html), Copyright John Bede Donnelly |
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