This thesis comprises an empirical study of the British role in Yugoslavia and its successor states between 1991 and 1995, and demonstrates that the British government led the international 'consensus' during that time, through what may be considered a doctrine of assertive appeasement while, at the same time, misleading parliament on issues crucial to an understanding of the situation. It also demonstrates that British policy was consistent, unlike that of its western allies, in obstructing initiatives aimed at effective international military intervention, which resulted in a prolongation of the war, and advanced the agenda of the Belgrade regime. The motives which may have guided British policy in this instance are discussed briefly in the introductory chapter which offers an outline of the global framework within which British policy was formulated in the wake of the Cold War, with particular reference to Britain's place in the New European order, following the downing of the Berlin Wall, and in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty. A chronological approach has been adopted as the most appropriate in demonstrating some of the intricate manoeuvres which characterised British diplomacy in the region at crucial junctures of the war.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:443447 |
Date | January 2004 |
Creators | Grbin, Carole A. |
Publisher | University of Glasgow |
Source Sets | Ethos UK |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Source | http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6548/ |
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