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Previous issue date: 2004-04-29 / We develop a job-market signaling model where signals may convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study the GED exam and countersignaling (signals non-monotonic in ability). A result of the model is that countersignaling is more expected to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low non-cognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages. Additionally, it suggests modifications that would make the GED a more effective signal.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/268 |
| Date | 29 April 2004 |
| Creators | Gottlieb, Daniel |
| Contributors | Escolas::EPGE, FGV, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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