There is a debate on how air power should be employed to attain success in war and conflicts. Although scholars do not fully agree on the subject, there is a consensus that attacking the opponents military forces’, a course of action referred to as denial, can contribute to a positive outcome on the battlefield. This thesis investigates the utility of denial in air operations against regular and irregular opponents. The purpose of this study was to examine Robert Pape’s Denial Theory in a focused and structured comparative case study of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The investigation reveals that denial contributed to the ground offensives in both cases, specifically by providing air support in the theatre, which led to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and drew the opponents out of several cities in Afghanistan. The use of operative interdiction made freedom of action possible and resulted in the final collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In conclusion the investigation shows that denial may be a suitable modus operandi against both regular and irregular opponents. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-6788 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Dunert, Henrik |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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