There is a debate on how air power should be employed to attain success in war and conflicts. Although scholars do not fully agree on the subject, there is a consensus that attacking the opponents military forces’, a course of action referred to as denial, can contribute to a positive outcome on the battlefield. This thesis investigates the utility of denial in air operations against regular and irregular opponents. The purpose of this study was to examine Robert Pape’s Denial Theory in a focused and structured comparative case study of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. The investigation reveals that denial contributed to the ground offensives in both cases, specifically by providing air support in the theatre, which led to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and drew the opponents out of several cities in Afghanistan. The use of operative interdiction made freedom of action possible and resulted in the final collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In conclusion the investigation shows that denial may be a suitable modus operandi against both regular and irregular opponents. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

The debate amongst theorists on how to best utilize airpower is still ongoing. There is some consensus among scholars that attacking military targets directly is an effective strategy, one of those theorists is Robert A. Pape. Most research on the subject only examine historical cases and does not factor in more contemporary difficulties. The purpose of this study is to examine Robert A. Pape’s airpower theory of denial in a comparative case study. The two cases, Operation Odyssey Dawn and Enduring Freedom, are succesful contemporary operations where airpower played a major role in a military intervention with the intent to examine which part of Pape’s theory is still curant in modern and dynamic conflicts. The results show that the denial strategy contributed to the success in both cases for the most part by providing air support to ground troops. The effect of operational interventions differed between the cases and the reasons why may have several explanations. Strategic intervention had neither effect nor occurrence in either case which may be due to the operations reaching objectives in a short amount of time and to restrictions on collateral damage. Further research is required to cement the conclusions.