Environmental positive externalities from public provision, such as the benefits yielded from the public measure of nature conservation, are often not internalized.
Potential sub-optimal public service provision can be expected from such a condition, leading to inefficiency, if the benefits at a greater territorial scale are not acknowledged. This holds particularly true for intergovernmental fiscal relations in a decentralizing multi-tiered governmental system. Moreover, in developing countries the fiscal capacities to perform measures of ecological public functions are limited with their fiscal needs for these functions often appearing to outweigh their fiscal capacities.
Research at the interface of the economic theory of fiscal federalism, the
sustainability concept, and policies related to conservation and the environment is
relatively new. Furthermore, in the literature on environmental federalism the emphasis tends to be comparatively less on the benefits of positive environmental externalities. The essential contribution of this study is an extension of this research field that is still in its infancy by applying the specific case of Indonesia as the context, on account of this tropical country‟s ecological significance as well as its recent developments during the fiscal decentralization process. The overall aim of this study is to assess the possibilities of ecological fiscal transfers as a set of instruments in the public sector to internalize environmental externalities. To this end, the study traces the development as well as the current state of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Indonesia in terms of ecological purposes. On the basis of this knowledge, the study offers new policy perspectives by proposing a number of policy options for ecological fiscal transfers in the context of the functioning fiscal transfer system and institutions between the national and the subnational (province and local) governments as well as among jurisdictions at the same governmental level. The incorporation of an explicit ecological indicator into general-purpose transfers is the first option. The second option is derived from a revenue-sharing arrangement. In this arrangement, two sub-options are proposed: first, shared revenues from taxes are distributed on the basis of the ecological indicator and, second, shared revenues from natural resources are earmarked for environmental purposes. Finally, the third option suggests an extension of existing specific-purpose transfers for the environment. The potential and limitations of the respective options are addressed. Additionally, a short treatment is given to the discourse on the possible mobilization of fiscal resources in the context of tropical deforestation and global climate change.
The research concentrates mainly on the first option, namely the incorporation of
an ecological indicator into the structure of general-purpose transfer allocation. In order to substantiate an explicit ecological dimension in the transfer, it extends the present area-based approach by introducing a protected area indicator while maintaining the remaining socio-economic indicators in the fiscal need calculation. The parameter values of area-related indicators are adjusted and subject to the properties of the existing formula. The simulation at the provincial level yields the following results. First, more provinces lose rather than gain from the introduced ecological fiscal transfer when compared to the fiscal transfer that they received in the reference fiscal year. Second, on average the winning provinces obtain a higher level of transfer from the introduction of an ecological indicator in the fiscal need calculation. The extent of the average decreases for the losing provinces, however, it is lower compared to the extent of the average gain by their winning counterparts. In terms of spatial configurations of the general-purpose transfer with an ecological indicator, provinces in Papua would benefit most from the new fiscal regime whereas provinces in Java and Sulawesi, with a few exceptions, would suffer a transfer reduction. Kalimantan and Sumatera show a mixed pattern of winning and losing provinces. The analysis on the equalization effects of the general-purpose transfers makes the following important contributions. It suggests that, first, the transfers are equalizing and, second, the introduction of the protected area indicator into the structure of these transfers plays a significant role in the equalizing effect, particularly in the presence of provinces with a very high fiscal capacity and when the area variable is also controlled. All of these new insights are imperative in the design of fiscal policy which intends to integrate explicit ecological aspects into the instruments of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
Since a formula-based fiscal transfer distribution is intrinsically zero-sum, the
aforementioned configuration of winning and losing jurisdictions is conceivable. Among other future perspectives, it is the task of further research to explore ecological fiscal transfer instruments and associated measures that on the one hand seek to induce the losing provinces to join their winning counterparts and, on the other hand, are still subject to the requirements of the rational fiscal transfer mechanism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DRESDEN/oai:qucosa.de:bsz:15-qucosa-69240 |
| Date | 28 June 2011 |
| Creators | Mumbunan, Sonny |
| Contributors | Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Prof. Dr. Thomas Lenk, Prof. Dr. Bernd Hansjuergens |
| Publisher | Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig |
| Source Sets | Hochschulschriftenserver (HSSS) der SLUB Dresden |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | doc-type:doctoralThesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
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