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Previous issue date: 2007-11-26 / Starting from the idea that the result of the Humean analysis of causal inferences must be applied coherently to the remaining part of his work, including its moral theory, the present master thesis aims at investigating whether Hume?s moral philosophy is essentially based on feeling, or whether this would not be rather essentially a consequence of our causal inferences in human actions and deliberations. The main idea consists in showing that our moral inferences, to the extent that they are for Hume empirical , depend on our belief in a connexion between something which has been previously observed and something which is not being observed ( but that it is expected to occur or to be observed in the future). Thus, this very belief must base our moral inferences concerning the actions and deliberations of the individuals. Therefore, must e o ipso induce us to associate actions and behaviors, as well as character and moral claims of men to certain moral feelings. Accordingly, the thesis is unfolded in three chapters. In the first chapter Hume?s theory of the perception is reported as essential part of the explanation or the principles that bind ideas in our mind and constitute our inferences. In the second chapter, the Humean analysis of causal inferences is presented and the way they contribute in the formation of our moral inferences is explained. In the third and last chapter, the formation of our moral inferences and the real contribution of the doctrine of freedom and necessity for the examination or our actions are analysed and discussed. / Partindo da id?ia de que o resultado da an?lise humeana das infer?ncias causais deve aplicar-se coerentemente ao restante de sua obra, incluindo sua teoria moral, a presente disserta??o objetiva investigar se a filosofia moral de Hume se fundamenta no sentimento, ou se isto n?o seria antes essencialmente uma
conseq??ncia de nossas infer?ncias causais. A id?ia central consiste em mostrar que nossas infer?ncias morais, na medida em que para Hume s?o emp?ricas, dependem da nossa cren?a em uma conex?o entre o que foi anteriormente observado e algo que n?o ? observado ( mas espera-se ocorrer ou observar-se no
futuro ). Assim, essa mesma cren?a fundamentaria nossas infer?ncias morais sobre as a??es dos indiv?duos, e conseq?entemente, nos levaria a associar determinados comportamentos, bem como o car?ter e as convic??es morais dos homens a certos sentimentos morais . A disserta??o desdobra-se em tr?s cap?tulos. No primeiro cap?tulo relata-se a teoria da percep??o e mostra-se que ela constitui parte essencial da explica??o das nossas infer?ncias . No segundo
cap?tulo, trata-se da an?lise das infer?ncias causais e como contribuem na forma??o das nossas infer?ncias morais. No terceiro, a partir da an?lise anterior, investiga-se a forma??o de nossas infer?ncias morais e a real contribui??o da doutrina da necessidade e da liberdade para o exame de nossas a??es.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:repositorio.ufrn.br:123456789/16451 |
| Date | 26 November 2007 |
| Creators | Jota, Renato de Medeiros |
| Contributors | CPF:00052182762, http://lattes.cnpq.br/1832122126753450, Erickson, Glenn Walter, CPF:34302575400, Costa, Claudio Ferreira, CPF:44547544700, http://lattes.cnpq.br/2767426717797330, Conte, Jaimir, Bonaccini, Juan Adolfo |
| Publisher | Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Programa de P?s-Gradua??o em Filosofia, UFRN, BR, Metaf?sica |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | Portuguese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRN, instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, instacron:UFRN |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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