The main objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the economic logic behind fisheries policy and redistribution in South African. An examination of the institutional and organizational evolution reveals that South African fisheries policy followed the world trend in the movement toward quota management systems. However, it is argued that due to the peculiarities of the Apartheid political system, South Africa developed a unique and persistent structure of individual fishing rights that resulted in a transfer of power from the fisher to monopsonistic, and subsequently vertically integrated, fish processing companies. Problems, however, arose with the need to redistribute fishing rights to previously repressed racial groups. It is proposed that, within a specific form (TAC), the structure of individual fishing rights can be decomposed into four operational rules, namely, the right of participation, asset size, tradability and duration of term. Policy design is restricted to a feasible set of rules that impact on the flexibility of the system, the incentives facing private fishing companies and fishers, the efficiency of the fisheries management plan and finally the effect it has on a redistribution strategy. Within this analytical framework, South Africa's policy yields a very flexible system favourable to monopsonistic industrial organisation. However, by adding a redistribution constraint, this structure has a number of important effects. First, as new quota holders are added the information costs for effective fisheries management increase exponentially. Second, the transaction costs to private fishing companies are increased. Third, only the resource rent is redistributed (weak redistribution). Next, the micro to small vessel fisheries, the medium vessel fisheries and the large vessel fisheries are examined separately. The major aim is to determine, within the available data, the effect that a weak redistribution policy (redistribution of the resource rent), has on strong redistribution (redistribution of fishing capital and skills). The evidence definitely supports the analytical framework and suggests that fundamentally the structure of individual fishing rights, which evolved in response to a monopsonistic industrial organisation during the apartheid era in South Africa, works against strong redistribution. Also, that different fisheries face different constraints and that these should in certain instances be treated separately.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:rhodes/vital:1061 |
| Date | January 2005 |
| Creators | Mather, Diarmid John |
| Publisher | Rhodes University, Faculty of Commerce, Economics and Economic History |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis, Doctoral, PhD |
| Format | 413 leaves, pdf |
| Rights | Mather, Diarmid John |
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