Dans la pensée contemporaine (tous domaines confondus), le traditionnel problème du fondement a disparu. Et cela à juste titre : les plus importants résultats aujourd’hui ont été obtenus, en effet, sans passer par une hypostase méthodologique que le concept de « fondement » impose à la pensée. La phénoménologie, plus que toute autre approche, semble avoir accompli ce processus ; pour ce faire, cependant, elle a gardé un vocabulaire souvent ambigu ; voire, elle s’est réclamée expressément comme étant au fondement des sciences. Notre travail trouve son point de départ, dans la philosophie d’inspiration phénoménologique de Michel Henry. Elle permet de penser un fondement sans passer par la violence d’un maître-mot, et simultanément sans passer par le dogme d’une théorie où le fondement porterait à une réaffirmation des dualismes, lui-même hypostasié (comme « être » par exemple). Pour Henry, le fondement, comme ce qui est sans condition, est l’apparaître de quelque chose. À son tour, il se dit comme une condition absolue de tout ce qui se manifeste, comme une force de manifestation de l’être. Mais le chemin vers un fondement s’avère difficile, puisqu’il n’existe pas de thématisation de ce concept chez Henry, ni de possibilité de « concept » de fondement dans le « dire le phénomène », dans un langage qui doit, pour se dire fondamental, exprimer l’immédiateté de la manifestation en tant que telle, une manifestation qui se dise elle-même sans avoir recours à une référence externe. Peu importe la manière, le fondement doit lui-même bâtir sa propre problématique. Le phénomène du fondement représente, à travers un parcours aux limites de la philosophie, à la fois théorétique, empirico-transcendantale et expérimental, la tentative de penser le fondement comme ce qui se manifeste et, sans médiation, manifeste une altérité finalement comprise à partir d’une immanence irréductible. / In contemporary thinking (all fields included), the traditional problem of the foundation has disappeared. Rightfully: the most important results today have been obtained, in fact, without going through a methodological hypo-stasis that the concept of “foundation” imposes to the thought. Phenomenology, more than any other approach, seems to have been through this process ; for doing so, however, it kept a vocabulary often ambiguous ; it even claimed it specifically as the foundation of science. Our work finds its starting point, in the phenomenological philosophy of Michel Henry. It suggests a basis without going through the violence of a master word, and simultaneously bypassing the dogma of a theory in which the foundation would be a reaffirmation of dualism, itself an hypo-stasis (as the "being", for example). For Henry, the foundation, understood as what is unconditional, is the appearing of something. Thus he says as an absolute condition that manifests itself as a force of manifestation of being. But the path to one foundation is difficult, since there is no theming of this concept in Henry, and no possibility of “concept” basis in the “to say the The phenomenon of foundation. Essay on the philosophy of Michel Henry.In contemporary thinking (all fields included), the traditional problem of the foundation has disappeared. Rightfully: the most important results today have been obtained, in fact, without going through a methodological hypo-stasis that the concept of “foundation” imposes to the thought. Phenomenology, more than any other approach, seems to have been through this process ; for doing so, however, it kept a vocabulary often ambiguous ; it even claimed it specifically as the foundation of science. Our work finds its starting point, in the phenomenological philosophy of Michel Henry. It suggests a basis without going through the violence of a master word, and simultaneously bypassing the dogma of a theory in which the foundation would be a reaffirmation of dualism, itself an hypo-stasis (as the "being", for example). For Henry, the foundation, understood as what is unconditional, is the appearing of something. Thus he says as an absolute condition that manifests itself as a force of manifestation of being. But the path to one foundation is difficult, since there is no theming of this concept in Henry, and no possibility of “concept” basis in the “to say the phenomenon”, in a language that has, to say fundamental, to express the immediacy of the event as such, an event which tells itself without using an external reference. Anyway, the foundation itself must build its own problems. The phenomenon is the basis, through a journey to the limits of philosophy, theoretical, empirico-transcendental and experimental, trying to understand of the foundation as what is manifest and without mediation, manifest otherness finally understood from an irreducible immanence.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:theses.fr/2012STRAC020 |
| Date | 19 September 2012 |
| Creators | De Sanctis, Francesco Paolo |
| Contributors | Strasbourg, Università Ca' Foscari (Venise, Italie), Rogozinski, Jacob, Ruggenini, Mario |
| Source Sets | Dépôt national des thèses électroniques françaises |
| Language | French |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, Text |
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