Between 1961 and 1976 Häi Hung province -- present day Häi Duong and Hung
Yên -- lost the equivalent of two entire districts of agricultural land. How could so
much land be abandoned under a collectivised agriculture system? And what role
did poor water control infrastructure play in creating such a situation?¶
I answer these questions by examining the historical patterns of hydraulic
development in northern Vietnam from the beginning of the 19th century until the
introduction of the Production Contract system in 1981. Underlying both the
French colonial and communist visions of modernity and economic development
was a belief that improving agricultural productivity, of which large-scale hydraulic
infrastructure was an important component, could catalyse growth in the rural
economy, which could then finance industrialisation. I argue throughout this thesis
that developing large-scale hydraulic infrastructure in the Red River delta has relied
upon the creation of a hydraulic bargain between the state and water users. This is
in contrast to Wittfogel's theory of the hydraulic state, insofar as developing
hydraulic infrastructure has depended upon the active political and economic
participation and support of water users, and not the absolute power of the state.
The political economic history of the hydraulic bargain highlights the relative
power of peasants to influence the direction of large-scale hydraulic development
and, as such, the shape of the Red River delta's wet-rice economy.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/216775 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Smith, S. Andrew Enticknap, ANDREW_SMITH@acdi-cida.gc.ca |
| Publisher | The Australian National University. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | http://www.anu.edu.au/legal/copyrit.html), Copyright S. Andrew Enticknap Smith |
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