When we consider the active involvement of a subject of an emotional state, we have to say that intentionality of emotional states is conative rather than cognitive. Emotion is much closer to desire or a conative state than a belief or perception. Since a conative state is successful when it is carried out, a conative intentional state is more related to action toward others and events rather than passive perception. So it is important to examine the relation between emotion and action to see emotion as an active response. In the first, second and third chapter of my thesis, I will argue that since perception is too passive to be emotions, it is wrong to insist that emotions are a kind of perception. In the fourth chapter, I will show that it is impossible to have emotions without self-involvement. In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the relation between emotions and action through the cases of brain damaged patients and the Confucianist theory of emotion. / text
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UTEXAS/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4594 |
| Date | 27 February 2012 |
| Creators | Hwang, Woo-Young |
| Source Sets | University of Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
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