In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio. / In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0090351013 |
| Creators | 翁珮珊, Pei-Shan Weng |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 英文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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