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International bank supervisory standards : the case of the Basle Committee and capital adequacy standardsNorton, J. J. January 1995 (has links)
No description available.
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Banking Regulation In South Africa in light of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemicMagagula, Compassion Sihe Fikile 26 May 2021 (has links)
2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis identified causes within financial institutions which required to be reviewed, strengthened and some introduced to safeguard safety and soundness of financial institutions. These measures would ensure banks in particular are still able to provide their services even during times of economic downturn. Covid-19 pandemic presented an opportunity to assess the measures. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Mercantile Law / LLM (Mercantile Law) / Unrestricted
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Deconstructing the tensions in the financial services industryKhalidi, Manzoor Anwar January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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Basel III : A study of Basel III and whether it may protect against new banking failuresJohansson, Emilia January 2012 (has links)
The financial crisis of 2007 until today affected the banking industry to a large extent. Many banks failed or got bailed out by governments. To protect against banking failures and new financial crises the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has reviewed, renewed and extended the banking regulations. The result is a framework for banking regulations called Basel III. This study examines the Basel III framework and its potential effect on protecting the banks. The study answers the question: if Basel III may protect against new banking failures. The study has used a qualitative approach. The theoretical framework has been built up by the use of the literature review. Literature has mainly been found by use of the university library’s online databases. For the empirical results interviews were made with banks and supervisors from Sweden and from Finland to see their view on the emerging framework. The views of supervisors and banks are that Basel III should have tougher requirements than it now has. The capital requirements are seen as too low and the risk-weights are criticized not to reflect the reality. Supervisors are still positive and believe that Basel III will give a better protection, but it will not fully protect against failures. Banks have a similar view, some are positive and believe that it will give a better protection while others do not think it will protect against failures any better.
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Banking Regulations in An Incomplete Contract Model: Evidence from Taiwan Market / 不完全契約模型下銀行監理之探討—以台灣本國銀行為例翁珮珊, Pei-Shan Weng Unknown Date (has links)
In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio. / In this thesis, we follow the incomplete contract model developed by Freixas and Rochet (1997). They model the decision of a bank regulator for continuing the sound bank or restructuring the failing bank as a game between bank equity owners, the bank manager, and the regulator under the incomplete contract framework. In this essay, we apply this incomplete contract model to Taiwan empirical data. After using several kinds of financial ratios as our indicators, we select nine ratios to process our empirical examination. And we find that: there are two banks appeared in the “ex-post efficient interference” segment except two ratios and also another two banks shown in the “ex-post efficient passivity” segment except one ratio.
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Awareness of the new capital requirements in the light of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis : A study focused on the loan officers, managers and board members working in Scandinavian banks / Medvetande av de nya kapitaltäckningskraven i ljuset at den Europeiska finanskrisenJernbeck, Camilla January 2012 (has links)
This paper surveys the insider opinions and awareness’s of swedish bank loan officers, managers and board members on their view of the new capital requirements in light of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, less than optimal rules and the opaqueness of state issued sovereigns. The paper will try to find the rationale in the reasoning of bank insiders and discuss their views in relation to current research. The ground breaking inside perspective will give researchers insight into the bank insiders’ view, which is previously not known in current research.
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Návrh inovace systému bankovní regulace / The proposal of innovations in banking regulationKUDÝN, David January 2015 (has links)
This master dissertation aim to chart the genesis and trends of the recent banking regulations in the context of the dynamic events which have occurred on the financial markets from year 2008, first of all in the framework of sovereign risk regulation. On the base of analyze these processes try to find solutions how to improve the banking regulations.
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Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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Aspects of money laundering in South African lawVan Jaarsveld, Izelde Louise 04 1900 (has links)
Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired
through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money
laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the
benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of
schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the
premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the
benefits of their criminal activities.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s
anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties
on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of
crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates
civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the
idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards
recommendations aimed at improving its structure.
To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated.
The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen
consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud
or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example,
the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction
report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank
parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be
entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover
loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank.
Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned
and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time
contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.
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