Bakgrund: Penningtvätt har under de senaste åren ökat och fått mycket uppmärksamhet. Nya lagar och regleringar med syfte att förebygga och bekämpa penningtvätt har tagits fram. För att uppnå målen har ett flertal organisationer skapats på nationell och international nivå. Flera tillsynsmyndigheter har fått uppdraget att medverka i bekämpning av penningtvätt. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka revisorns förhållnings- sätt till lagen om penningtvätt. Studien syftar även till att redogöra för revisorns ansvar gentemot penningtvättslagen samt framhålla vad begreppet kundkännedom innebär för revisorn i förhållande till lagen. Metod: För att uppnå studiens syfte har denna undersökning använt sig av den kvalitativa metoden. Intervjuformen som tillämpas är semi-strukturerad och studiens urval är ett icke-sannolikhetsurval. Undersökningens oberoende variabler är penningtvättslagen, revisorns ansvar och kundkännedom. Resultat: Studien visar att penningtvättslagen inte i någon större uträckning påverkat revisorns förhållningssätt. Gällande revisorns ansvar i förhållande till lagen anses lagen tämligen verkningslös ur ett brottsbekämpande perspektiv men kan ha positiv verkan ur ett brottsförebyggande syfte. Slutligen visar studien att ett effektivt sätt att motverka penningtvätt är att ha en god relation till klienten. / Background: Money laundering has increased particularly in recent years and received much attention. New laws and regulations with the aim of preventing and combating money laundering have been introduced. To prevent and fight money laundering organizations have been created on international levels. On national levels different official regulators have received assignments to participate against money laundering. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the auditors' approach to the law of money laundering. The study will also explain the auditor's liability to the anti money laundering act and emphasize what the concept of customer due diligence means for the auditor in relation to the law. Method: In order to achieve the purpose of the study this survey uses the qualitative method. The interview shape applied is semi-structured with a non-probability selection. The independent variables of the study are the laundering act, the auditors' responsibility and costumer due diligence. Conclusion: The study shows that the money laundering act not has affected the auditors' approach to any greater extent. Regarding the auditors' responsibility the law is considerable ineffective from a law enforcement perspective but can deliver positive results from a law enforcement purposes. Finally, the study shows that an effective way to prevent money laundering is to have a good relationship with the client.

Bakgrund Penningtvätt är en typ av ekonomisk brottslighet där olagligt förtjänta pengar tvättas rena i den lagliga ekonomin. Cirka 130 miljarder kronor penningtvättas årligen i Sverige och eftersom det görs genom den lagliga ekonomin påverkar det samhället. Auktoriserade redovisningskonsulter arbetar nära kunders ekonomi och har tillgång till deras transaktioner. År 2018 anmäldes endast 7 fall av 19 306 av misstankar om penningtvätt från verksamhetsutövare inom revision och bokföring, trots auktoriserade redovisningskonsulters förutsättningar att upptäcka penningtvätt visar statistiken en annan riktning. Syfte Syftet med studien är att utforska varför auktoriserade redovisningskonsulter anmäler få fall av misstankar om penningtvätt. Metod Denna kvalitativa studie har främst en deduktiv ansats. Teorierna Beslutsteori, Struktur respektive bedömning, Bedrägeritriangeln och Modiferingsmodellen inom bedrägeri & revision har tillämpats på empiri. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom primärdata i form av intervjuer och har sedan analyserats med en tematisk analysmetod. Slutsats Studiens resultat visar flera olika anledningar varför få fall av misstankar om penningtvätt anmäls av auktoriserade redovisningskonsulter. Anledningarna kan vara att auktoriserade redovisningskonsulter har för lite kunskap och förståelse om penningtvätt samt att de bedömer bort risker i ett för tidigt skede. Studien bidrar med att uppmärksamma auktoriserade redovisningskonsulter om penningtvätt och hur förändringar bör ske för att kunna öka antalet anmälningar. / Introduction Money laundering is a kind of financial crime, illegal earned money is washed through the legal economy. About 130 billion SEK is money laundered annually in Sweden and since the money laundry is done through the legal economy it affects the society at large. Authorized accounting consultants work closely with customers’ finances and they have access to their transactions. In 2018 there were 19 306 suspicions of money laundering that were reported. Only 7 of these cases were reported by operators in auditing and accounting, despite the fact the authorized accounting consultants have the preconditions to detect money laundering even though statistics shows otherwise. Purpose The purpose of the study is to explore why authorized accounting consultants reports only a few cases of money laundering suspicions. Method This qualitative study mainly has a deductive approach. The theories used throughout the study are Decision theory, Structure and judgement, The fraud triangle and The modification model in fraud and auditing. These theories have been applied to empirical data throughout the study. The empirical data has been collected through primary data, interviews, which has been analysed with a thematic analysis method. Conclusion The study shows several different reasons why only a few cases of money laundering suspicions are reported by authorized accounting consultants. The reasons for the few reports of money laundering may be that authorized accounting consultants lack knowledge and understanding of money laundering. Risk assessment at an early stage is another contributing factor. The study coerces authorized accounting consultants to pay closer attention to money laundering and how changes should take place in order to increase the number of reports.

This thesis advances global governance literature by focusing on the conditions under which procedural harmonisation occurs and how it is characterised. It suggests that the existence of a network of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) complements great powers’ action and acts as a force for harmonisation in the making of international anti-money laundering (AML) standards. Procedural harmonisation is identified firstly, through a discussion on great power coalitions and how their interests set international agendas and impose compliance. Secondly, it is also recognised as an outcome of the IGOs’ network action through shared preferences, resource exchanges and stable relationships. Ultimately, the analysis determines that great powers are a necessary but not sufficient condition for procedural harmonisation, which is moreover favoured when legitimacy, expertise, and the need to achieve compliance are present. In sum, the thesis discusses the impact of international actors’ interactions in the making of international AML standards from 1989 to 2014, particularly the development of FATF Recommendations on ‘Customer Due Diligence’. The analysis identifies that the United States and the European Union, as great powers and members to the G-7, are the most influential actors. However, it adds that the IGOs network structure created between the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism is also a necessary actor to the achievement of procedural harmonisation. Data analysis is carried out through process-tracing, which triangulates elite interviews and non-participant observation with primary and secondary documents of legal, policy and expert nature. This thesis concludes that: a) procedural harmonisation is a product of international cooperation; b) IGOs gain influence in standard-making through network structures; and, c) procedural harmonisation may be an example to future global governance strategies if complemented with levels of legitimacy, expertise and the need to achieve compliance.

Ensuring security of online payment services Abstract The thesis is devoted to the topic of ensuring security of online payment services, especially in the context of identification and authentication of the client in the Internet when performing acts related to the provision of payment services. The issue of the customer identity is described especially in the context of know your customer principle governed by legal regulation in the area of combating money laundering and financing of terrorism, and in the context of the obligation to carry out a strong customer authentication (SCA) brought by the PSD2 directive and related RTS. The aim of the thesis is to describe and critically evaluate the legislation in the area of ensuring security of online payment services, meaning the binding legislation, soft law and rules created by entities operating on the payment services market. In this context, the thesis also deals with the question of proportionality of legislation in connection to the positive user experience and the possibility of implementing innovative FinTech solutions. The thesis is divided into four chapters, supplemented by introduction to the respective subject matter and conclusion summarizing the observations made in the thesis. The first chapter is devoted to the general definition of the...

With the implementation of more and more stringent measures to prevent money laundering, criminals are resorting to the expertise of lawyers for assistance in the formulation of increasingly complex money laundering schemes. This expertise is provided both wittingly and unwittingly. The purpose of this research was to consider whether the South African anti-money laundering legislation places suspicious transaction reporting obligations, which are in line with and meet international directives, conventions and best practice frameworks, on attorneys. The study entails a consideration of the suspicious transaction reporting obligations of lawyers introduced by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, the United Kingdom and South Africa and provides an understanding of the concept of money laundering, the money laundering process and the areas in which lawyers are vulnerable to money laundering. The research found that the suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of South African anti-money laundering legislation are not in line with international frameworks and best practice. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / tm2015 / Auditing / MPhil / Unrestricted

Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM

本國為因應2018年亞太防制洗錢組織（APG）相互評鑑事宜，相關單位陸續參照國際規範，如防制洗錢金融行動工作組織（FATF）2012年發布之「防制洗錢及打擊資恐與武器擴散國際標準40項建議」、巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)2014年發布之「健全有關防制洗錢及打擊資恐之風險管理」文件等，以及他國作法進行有關防制洗錢及打擊資恐法制規約、監管措施及自律規範等之修正，並促請義務機構強化執行，以期順利通過第三輪相互評鑑。 銀行向為洗錢及資恐犯罪喜好之金流管道，基於銀行提供之金融服務具安全性、便利性及多元化、全球化等優點，不僅吸引一般金融消費者與銀行緊密往來，亦同時受到不良分子之青睞，致金融體系資源易遭不當利用。銀行為金融體系之核心主體，負有防制洗錢及打擊資恐之義務與責任，本文爰就銀行業防制洗錢及打擊資恐實務切入，針對本國銀行應採行之因應措施基本架構進行探討。 本文將先介紹FATF之評鑑流程及方法論，以立下銀行進行防制洗錢及打擊資恐工作之目標，復就達成前開目標為方向，引述金融機構防制洗錢及打擊資恐機制之國際標準，繼而回歸國內外對銀行實際作為之法規要求，試行建構銀行防制洗錢及打擊資恐基本機制，末則就銀行於執行面可改善空間提出重點觀察建議。 隨著工業4.0、Bank3.0及Fintech（金融科技）之快速演進，銀行客戶樣貌及交易型態正在改變，健全防制洗錢及打擊資恐機制是所有銀行業共同面臨之進階版挑戰，本文謹提出銀行機制基本實務報告，俾作為開展細緻化措施之參考。另本文為一般性原則之探討，並非針對特定機構主體之描述，併此敘明。 / For the Mutual Evaluation which will be conducted by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in 2018, basing on the following consulting international norms, such as “International Standards on combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations)” published by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2012, “Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism” published by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2014 and foreign advanced practices, the Taiwan authorities have amended the legal system, laws and regulations, supervision measures and self-disciplines referred to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism Financing(CTF). Meanwhile, every relevant entity is enhancing the prevent measures and internal control on AML/CFT (Counter-Financing of Terrorism) as well. The satisfactory result of the Third Round Mutual Evaluation will be expected. As people know, the banks are always the favorite cash flow channel of money laundering and terrorism financing, since the banks provide the financial services with advantages of safety, convenience, diversification and globalization, etc. Both general financial customers and criminals on ML/FT are attracted to make transactions with the banks. Thus, the financial system’s resources could be utilized improperly. Due to the role of the core of financial system, the banks should take the responsibility and bear the liability of Anti-Money Laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. In this paper, the primary framework on AML/CFT of domestic banks will be outlined according to the real practice. First, this paper has an introduction of mutual evaluation process and methodology in order to set the goal related to AML/CFT of the bank. Next, the model practices of international standards are presenting to achieve the goal for references. Then, this paper will focus on domestic and foreign regulatory requirements on banking, and try to construct the bank’s primary internal system of AML/CFT. Finally, there are some observations of the bank’s performance related to this issue. With the rapid evolution of Industry 4.0, Bank 3.0 and Fintech, the customers’ financial behaviors and transaction types are changing. Therefore, to keep sound internal system of AML/CFT is an advanced challenge to all the banks. This paper is trying to set a primary framework on AML/CFT of domestic banks, and to be taken reference for banks to start developing appropriate prevent measures. In addition, the statement of this paper is an approach to general principles, not indicating any specific institution.

Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.