This paper examines whether the presence of transient institutional investors is associated with increases in firms’ return on net operating assets. Previous research argues that the short-term focus of institutional investors influences the corporate strategy of managers; as a result, institutional investors induce managerial myopia. I test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between transient institutional ownership—ownership by institutions that exhibit “transient” behavior—and return on net operating assets (RNOA). The results are inconclusive, as my regressions generate conflicting results. Therefore, the theory that transient institutional ownership causes myopia can neither be confirmed nor denied. Furthermore, I find that transient institutional ownership has an inverse relationship with asset turnover, which in the context of DuPont Analysis suggests that transient institutional ownership leads to decreases in RNOA and decreases in myopic behavior. This result contradicts my hypothesis, inferring that institutional ownership reduces managerial myopia.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2814 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Creators | Young, Bracebridge, III |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2017 Bracebridge H. Young, default |
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