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ABSTRACT Prior relative studies document that the mean initial returns of IPOs is significantly positive. Yet, several researches find that the positive abnormal returns appear to be a short-run phenomenon, and the long-run performance of IPOs is poor even negative. Based on a sample of 151 Taiwan IPO firms issued form 1991 to 1996, this study employ the Fama-French three factors model to measure the expected returns of securities. Consistent with predictions, the empirical results show positive short-run returns and a negative long run returns. Meanwhile, there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and the holding period abnormal returns aftermarket. The conclusion is consistent with the concerns of long-term profitability of institutional investors, as they used to buy low for the benefits of long-term profits. This study also examines the influential factors of institutional ownership. The findings indicate that both firm size and insiders are significantly positive related to institutional ownership. However, neither managerial ownership nor debt is related to institutional ownership. On the other hand, there is significantly negative relationship between stock dividend and institutional ownership, except the second year. At the initial and the first month, cash dividend is negative related to institutional ownership, and industry dummy variable (electronic industry or not) is positive related to institutional ownership. Besides, there is no relationship between cash dividend and institutional ownership, nor was there any relationship between industry dummy variable and institutional ownership. According to the findings, most institutional investors want to maintain the diversification and long-term profits of the portfolio investment.

This thesis investigates the monitoring effect from institutional ownership on bidder Chief Executive Officer (hereafter CEO) compensation in mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) as well as the shift in compensation structure. While it is well-established in the literature that bidder CEO compensation soars significantly after conducting such transactions, the sources of the growth are left unclear. One major argument, the traditional theory, proposes that the growth derives from additional wealth created to shareholders in M&A, because according to the nature of compensation contract, CEOs’ interests are effectively aligned with shareholders’ benefits. On the other hand, scholars of managerial power theory argue that managerial power is stronger than shareholders’ oversight, so managers use M&A as a cover to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Whether the traditional theory or the managerial power theory dominates depends on the presence of optimal contract and the effectiveness of corporate governance. Institutional owners have more motivation and resources to restrict managerial behaviour than diffused owners. Thus, the change in CEO compensation following M&A and the driving factors behind the change could be different in firms with different types of ownership. After examining the 268 merger events from 266 US public non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005, this study finds that the magnitude of increase in CEO cash-based compensation is significantly alleviated in the presence of large institutional shareholders, and that the increase seems to be positively related to good short-term performance rather than managerial power. However, the concentrated institutional ownership does not seem to affect CEO equity-based compensation or the change in compensation structure. Besides, we do not find any significant relation between firm long-term post-acquisition performance and the market reaction to the announcement of M&A. Thus, we propose that without a reliable indication from short-term performance, large institutional shareholders could have problems in understanding the potential impact of M&A and they might adjust CEO equity-based compensation in a serial process after M&A.

The effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on the firm’s stock returns and volatility and financial performance has long been an interesting issue in the international business literature. A lot of debate has been going on regarding the relationship between institutional ownership, ownership concentration, returns, volatility and financial performance. The objective of this thesis is to study the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on firm stock returns and financial performance of the listed companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. For this purpose, panel data model is employed. The results from the analysis show that institutional ownership has no effect on ex post stock returns as well as ex ante stock returns. On the contrary, institutional ownership represented by top management and individuals have a negative and significant effect on stock volatility, while employee associations have a positive and significant effect. No significant effect is detected on ex ante risk except for employee associations that have negative and significant effect on ex ante risk. In addition, the results show that institutional ownership has no effect on stock liquidity except employee associations and individuals that have a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity. Finally, the results show that institutional ownership represented by companies, holdings and individuals have negative effect on financial performance represented by ROA and ROE. Also, institutional ownership has no effect on debt to equity ratio except banks that have negative and significant effect and employee associations that have positive and significant effect. The results also show that ownership concentration has no effect on ex post stock returns but it has a positive effect on ex ante stock returns. Also, it has no effect on ex post risk but it has a positive effect on ex ante risk. On the other hand, ownership concentration has a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity. Finally, the results show that ownership concentration has no effect on either financial performance represented by ROA and ROE or debt to equity ratio. As such, the thesis makes an important contribution to the literature, since it tests the impact of ownership type and concentration on ex ante returns and volatility of stocks in Egypt, an emerging country that has been ignored in literature. Also, the analysis extends the literature by decomposing institutional ownership to several types. Moreover, it adds two components of volatility, volatility clustering and persistence, testing their effect on ex post and ex ante risk, which is not dealt by previous studies.

This paper investigates the impact of related party transactions on a firm’s operating performance and market-based performance, as well as the impact of institutional ownership on the use of related party transactions. Using a sample of 1218 deals from S&P1500 firms from 2007 to 2018, we propose and examine three relevant hypotheses: (a) related party transactions, especially, “Red-flag” related party transactions are negatively related to firm’s operating performance, (b) related party transactions, especially, “Red-flag” related party transactions are negatively related with firm’s marketbased performance, (c) institutional ownership is negatively related with related party transactions. In summary, we do not find a significant relationship between related party transactions and firm’s operating performance, such as ROA, Profit Margin and COGS. As for firm’s market-based performance, we found related party transactions are positively related with Tobin’s-Q, but are not significantly related with 12-months buy and hold abnormal return. Finally, we do not find any significant relationship between overall institutional investors and RPTs, but we find short-horizon institutional investors reduce the use of related party transactions, but long-horizon institutional investors do not limit the use of RPT

This paper examines whether the presence of transient institutional investors is associated with increases in firms’ return on net operating assets. Previous research argues that the short-term focus of institutional investors influences the corporate strategy of managers; as a result, institutional investors induce managerial myopia. I test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between transient institutional ownership—ownership by institutions that exhibit “transient” behavior—and return on net operating assets (RNOA). The results are inconclusive, as my regressions generate conflicting results. Therefore, the theory that transient institutional ownership causes myopia can neither be confirmed nor denied. Furthermore, I find that transient institutional ownership has an inverse relationship with asset turnover, which in the context of DuPont Analysis suggests that transient institutional ownership leads to decreases in RNOA and decreases in myopic behavior. This result contradicts my hypothesis, inferring that institutional ownership reduces managerial myopia.

Previous studies have concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) has not been successful in controlling the outcomes of the auditor-client relationship. Additionally, the literature concludes that high institutional ownership enhances audit quality through monitoring the management-auditor relationship. This paper hypothesizes that better corporate governance in terms of high institutional ownership percentage will enhance audit quality during a MAFR regime. Since countries that have implemented MAFR in the past have their data in their local languages, I use the special case of Arthur Andersen clients based in the US as my treatment group. I carry out a descriptive statistical analysis and run linear OLS regressions with discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality as my dependent variable. Results suggest that the percentage of institutional ownership does not have a significant impact on audit quality in a MAFR regime.

My dissertation consists of two chapters which explores various aspects of empirical corporate finance and institutional ownership. In the first chapter, I examine whether common owners – an institution with holdings in both the distressed and the lending firm – ameliorates this conflict given that common owners should seek to maximize the equity value of both firms. The results show that when a common owner holds a stake in both the borrowing and lending firm, distressed firms are over 3.3-times more likely to file for Chapter 11 freefall bankruptcy (rather than prepack) as compared to borrowing-lending firms without a common owner. Using ownership of passive funds as an instrument for the presence of a common owner, I provide evidence of a causal relation between common ownership and bankruptcy filing choice. Overall, the analysis indicates that common ownership in both financially distressed borrowing firms and their lending firms leads to a greater likelihood of Chapter 11 freefall bankruptcy filing; suggesting that common owners typically side with creditors to maximize their combined equity value in both the borrowing and lending firm. Next, I examine the effect of CEO social connections on stock returns. An equally weighted (value weighted) long-short portfolio strategy earns investors excess returns of 5.39% (4.44%) per year. Three potential reasons explain the relation between CEO social connections and excess returns; better firm performance, investor information asymmetry, and/or greater investor risk-bearing. Our analysis provides evidence consistent with CEO connections both increasing firm risk and improving firm performance. / Business Administration/Finance

I analyze the relationship between insider trading outcomes and insiders' information environment within a network. While most existing studies rely on one dimension of commonality (e.g., personal ties, professional ties, geographic proximity) to construct the social network, I document the formation of the institutional investor groups (cliques) that exogenously connect firm-level insiders within the social network. Using difference-in-differences designs examining changes in clique size, I provide empirical evidence on the information dissemination channels within a network in which its members are quasi-randomly selected. Insider transactions in larger cliques exhibit lower abnormal trading profits, higher level of trading frequency, and larger amount of trade size, suggesting information dissemination is increasing in clique size. Then, I provide empirical evidence that the association between the value of information and the information dissemination rate is monotonic, consistent with prior theoretical studies. / Doctor of Philosophy / People communicate and are influenced by other people when they reside in a social network. I analyze how corporate insiders' trading outcomes are influenced by their information environment within a network. Most current research rely on one specific type of connection (e.g., personal relationships, professional relationships, geographic proximity) to build the social network, I provide evidence that firm-level insiders are involuntarily connected by the institutional investor social network (cliques). Using archival study approach, I document that insider transactions in larger cliques exhibit lower abnormal trading profits, higher level of trading frequency, and larger amount of trade size, suggesting information dissemination is increasing in clique size. Then, I provide empirical evidence that the association between the value of information and the information dissemination rate is linear, consistent with prior theoretical studies.

This study examines the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy of 284 firms listed on the OMX Stockholm Exchange in Swedenfrom 2010-2015. Specifically, the purpose of the study is to investigate therelationship betweendifferentinvestor types and dividend policies of firms, measured as dividend yield and dividend payout ratio.Also, the study aims to predict dividend behaviours based on ownership structure which may be useful inthe future since ownership structures of listed Swedish firms havebeen changing over time, with an increased consolidation of ownership and a sharpincrease in institutional ownership. The sample consistsof 1046 observations and was gathered from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream and Eikon databases. This is the first study to examine the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy in Sweden.The dividend policy is measured using two dependent variables; dividend payout ratio anddividend yield and a multiple regression has been used in orderto test the hypotheses whether any relationships exist between 17 different types of ownership structure used as independent variables, four additional control variables and dividend policy.The findings indicated significant positive relationships between institutional ownership and dividend yield and dividend payout, with one exception being private equity which exhibited a negative relationship with dividend yield. Furthermore, market capitalization, return on assets and price to book value are positively related to dividend payout while debt/equity ratio showed a negative relationship with dividend yield. The results contradict those of the most recent research conducted in Turkey (Al-Najjar & Kilincarsla, 2016) but adds supportin the debateto existing theories of dividends’ relevance to the value of firms developed by Gordon (1963), Lintner (1962) and Walter (1963). Limitations of the study include the geographical delimitation to Sweden which creates some constraints to wider generalization ofthe results to other geographical settings. Furthermore, the datacollected from Thomson Reuters Eikon hadmissing values, showed signs of heteroscedasticity and relevant investor variables such as family ownership were unavailable.