This study is an empirical examination of a new theory that links dividends to institutional ownership in a framework of both information signaling and agency costs. Under this theory put forth by Allen, Bernardo and Welch in 2000, dividends are paid out to attract tax-favored institutional investors, thereby signaling good firm quality and/or more efficient monitoring. This is based on the premise that institutions are considered sophisticated investors with superior ability and stronger incentive to be informed about the firm quality compared to retail investors. On the agency level, institutional investors display monitoring capabilities, and can detect and correct managerial pitfalls, thus their presence serves as an assurance that the firm will remain well run. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the implications of the theory by testing various aspects of the relationship between dividends and institutional holdings. Unlike the prevalent literature on this topic, I give specific attention to the different types of institutional investors and their incentives to invest in dividend paying stocks. Moreover, I analyze the signaling and the agency effects on the market reaction to dividend initiations within the framework proposed by the theory. Finally, I test the smoothing effect institutions have on dividends by examining the firm's propensity to increase dividends given the level of institutional ownership. I find institutional holders to respond positively to dividend initiation announcements as they adjust their portfolios by buying or increasing their holdings of the dividend paying stock following the announcement. I also find that this response is displayed more strongly among tax-favored institutions. My test results also reveal that positive abnormal returns to dividend initiation announcements are a decreasing function of institutional holdings in the dividend initiating firm, and that this mitigating effect of institutional ownership on the market reaction to dividend initiations is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and more potential for agency problems. This evidence lends some degree of support to the tested theory. Additional support to lies in the test results of its smoothing hypothesis which reveal that as institutional ownership increases, the propensity of firms to increase dividends decreases.

Innovationsförmåga är viktigt för företags konkurrenskraft och är kopplad till ekonomisk tillväxt och ekologisk hållbarhet i samhället. Tidigare forskning har undersökt aktielikviditetens inverkan på innovationsförmågan hos amerikanska bolag men har kommit fram till motstridiga resultat. Vi utför multipla linjära regressionsanalyser på data från de 36 företag noterade på Stockholmsbörsens primära marknader som har varit noterade och haft FoU-kostnader 2004-2013. Vi kan inte finna ett statistiskt signifikant samband mellan aktielikviditet och innovationsförmåga. Indelning av företag efter storlek eller ägarstruktur påverkar inte det förhållandet. Vi tänker oss att kontrollen över svenska börsbolag är så pass koncentrerad att förändrad aktielikviditet inte påverkar makt-förhållandena till en sådan grad att företagsledningars incitament till innovativa satsningar förändras. Framtida forskning får utröna närmre varför det inte tycks finnas ett samband på den svenska marknaden trots att det eventuellt finns det på den amerikanska.

This paper uses survey data by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) from 1991-2013 to test the role that institutional ownership has on the relative informational efficiency of stock prices in the Hang Seng Index, using the R2 of stock prices as a measurement of efficiency. This paper finds that on the aggregate level, the presence of institutional ownership is positively associated with R2, reflecting a negative effect on the level of information incorporated into stock prices. However, in isolating foreign institutions, the relationship with R2 reverses, and I find a positive correlation with the informational efficiency of stock prices. Moreover, this paper finds that a period characterized by high growth in institutional shareholding does not necessarily correspond to a greater level of improvement in the informational environment of stock markets. The results however, lack significance, perhaps due to the shortcomings of the survey data which is limited to 21 annual observations when incorporating a t-1 year lag. With more observations we would expect a substantial increase in the significance of the coefficient on our explanatory variables.

This study examined the effect of foreign ownership on the financial and market performance of firms in the South African economy. To review this relationship 18 foreign owned firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index in 2010 were identified and paired with a locally owned firm of a similar size, in the same economic sector and with the same ownership model. The analysis was done in two phases. Phase One reviewed the financial and market indicators; Phase Two reviewed the investor return. The analysis in Phase One showed that foreign ownership did not result in any financial benefits for the firm, if Return on Assets and Return on Equity were used as proxies for financial performance. There was some evidence that foreign corporate firms create more value, as indicated by the percentage of EVA increase of 4.6% for the corporate ownership model. Differences in the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) between the local and foreign corporate ownership models could indicate that this increase is an accounting anomaly rather than an absolute benefit. Market growth data showed the opposite that locally owned institutional firms performed significantly better than foreign-owned institutional firms. In Phase Two, it was shown that although there was a material difference between the different portfolio returns, with the local portfolios performing better, the difference was not statistically significant. Overall, it can be concluded that there is very limited proof that foreign ownership has any secondary beneficial effect on the financial performance of South African firms. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Vi undersöker sambandet mellan volatilitet och institutionell breadth of ownership på Stockholmsbörsen mellan 2010 och 2018. Denna undersökning är unik eftersom vi använder breadth of ownership som mått på institutionellt ägande. Den från litteraturen formade hypotesen att institutionellt ägande bör ha en dämpande effekt på volatiliteten motbevisades. Vi fann istället att större breadth of ownership förknippas med högre volatilitet i medelstora och stora företag, medan sambandet inte var signifikant i små företag. Vidare såg vi att småbolag som lämnat utdelning förknippades med en högre volatilitet. Vi menar att dessa observationer till stor del kan förklaras av att institutioner skapar volatilitet i aktier de äger som följd av ökade handelsvolymer. / This paper investigates the relationship between stock return volatility and institutional breadth of ownership on the Swedish stock market during the period from 2010 to 2018. Our paper is unique in its form since we are using institutional breadth of ownership as a proxy for institutional ownership. The hypothesis is based on prior literature that suggests institutional ownership and volatility should be negatively correlated. Instead we found the relationship to be positive in medium and large firms, and not significant in small firms. Furthermore, we found that small firms that pay dividends have had a significant positive relation to volatility. We suggest that these observations largely can be explained by institutional investors increasing trading volumes, and as an extension increasing volatility.

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This dissertation examines the effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk taking. The first essay examines the effect on firm risk through the CEO ability channel, while the second essay examines the effect on firm risk through the institutional investor channel. This first essay investigates CEO risk management ability. Using CEO education as a proxy for ability I examine the relationship between CEO education and various types of risk: (1) market risk, (2) credit risk, and (3) operational risk. Propensity score methods are used as a way to deal with the endogenous matching problem which exists in the executive compensation literature. These methods are proposed as an alternative to the managerial fixed effects approaches such as ``spell fixed effects'' and the mover dummy variable method (MDV). While the managerial fixed effects methods would fail when the explanatory variables of interest are time-invariant, it is possible to capture this variation in managerial effects by using propensity score methods. I find that the effect on the various types of risks varies by the type of risk and by the type and quality of education. Firms with CEOs that have law degrees and actuarial credentials are associated with fewer operational risk events. While firms with CEOs that have MBA degrees are able to manage market risk better than their peers. Overall, the quality of CEO education matters, and in many cases it is associated with a simultaneous reduction in firm risk and increase in firm value. This second essay investigates the impact of institutional shareholder ownership on firm risk taking. I find a negative relationship between the aggregate institutional ownership percentage and firm risk taking. I also find that institutional ownership concentration induces risk taking. In addition, the effect on firm risk is stronger when institutional shareholders have majority control. The results provide support for both the prudent-man law and the large institutional shareholder hypotheses. Furthermore, the results are robust to quasi-experimental approaches including propensity score matching and doubly robust estimation. These findings provide additional evidence on the benefits and incentives of institutional shareholder monitoring. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

We re-examine the determinants of institutional ownership (IO) from a segmentation perspective -- i.e. accounting for a hypothesized systematic exclusion of stocks that cause high implementation or agency costs. Incorporating segmentation effects substantially improves both explained variance in IO and model parsimony (essentially requiring just one input: market capitalization). Our evidence clearly establishes a role for both implementation costs and agency considerations in explaining segmentation effects. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. Importantly, our study finds evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, a mass exodus of publicly listed stocks predicted to fall outside institutions' investable universe helps explain the listing puzzle. There has been no comparable exit by institutionally investable stocks. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, IO return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use our logistic model and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive returns, suggesting institution actions are informed. / Doctor of Philosophy / We demonstrate that implementation and agency frictions restrict professional money managers from ownership of particular stocks. We characterize this systematic exclusion of stocks as segmentation and show that a specification that accommodates the segmentation effect substantially improves the empirical fit of institutional demand. The adjusted R-squared increases substantially; the residuals are better behaved, and the dimensionality of institutions' demands for stock characteristics reduces from a list of 8-10 standard characteristics (e.g., market cap, liquidity, index membership, volatility, beta) to just one: a stock's market capitalization. Our evidence identifies a prominent role for both implementation costs and agency costs as determinants of institutional segmentation. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. In fact, we find that segmentation arises from a trade-off between implementation costs (which bind for larger institutions) and agency considerations (which bind for smaller institutions). Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. More importantly, we find evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. This conclusion is important to considerations of scale economies/diseconomies in investment management. The agency story goes in the opposite direction to the conventional wisdom underlying scale arguments. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, our evidence suggests that institutional segmentation coupled with growing institutional dominance in public equity markets may have had a truncating effect on the universe of listed stocks. Stocks predicted to fall outside of institutions' investable universe were common prior to the 1990s, but are now almost nonexistent. By contrast, stocks predicted to fall within institutions' investable universe have not declined over time. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, feasible return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use logistic specification and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with high (low) abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive (negative) returns, suggesting institution actions are informed.

Cette thèse analyse le lien entre la gouvernance d'entreprise et la liquidité par une validation empirique sur un échantillon d'entreprises cotées sur le marché boursier tunisien. Ce choix est motivé par le fait que les différences dans les systèmes de gouvernance entre les pays dans plusieurs aspects (concentration de la propriété, identité des actionnaires…) pourraient avoir des effets différents sur la liquidité des titres. Plus spécifiquement, nous nous proposons d'étudier, l'effet d'un mécanisme de gouvernance interne sur le coût de liquidité pour en déduire l'impact sur le coût du capital et par la suite la performance espérée des firmes. Dans un premier temps, nous appréhendons le concept de liquidité et mesurons son degré. Dans un deuxième temps, nous étudions la relation entre la liquidité et la performance des entreprises. La contribution du coût du service d'immédiateté se traduit par un escompte additionnel sur le coût du capital et la valeur des sociétés. Les résultats trouvés montrent que les fourchettes de prix sont reliées positivement à la rentabilité des fonds propres en valeur de marché. Ces résultats confirment que les entreprises les moins liquides doivent suggérer une rentabilité supérieure aux investisseurs (une prime d'illiquidité) afin de compenser la ponction des coûts de transactions sur la rentabilité de leurs portefeuilles. Enfin, nous constatons que la liquidité est un facteur non négligeable dans le domaine de la gouvernance d'entreprise dans la mesure où les grands actionnaires affectent négativement la liquidité des titres de l'entreprise. Nos résultats concluent à des implications différentes quant à l'identité des actionnaires. Les insiders augmentent les coûts de liquidité en raison de leur accès à l'information privée et pertinente. De même, une participation institutionnelle dans l'entreprise réduit la liquidité de ses titres mesurée par l'impact sur les prix. / This thesis analyzes the link between corporate governance and liquidity by an empirical validation on a sample of companies listed on the Tunisian stock market. We propose in the first chapter an overview of theoretical models and empirical concept of liquidity. In the second chapter, we are a part, an empirical study on stock liquidity in our sample, performing a descriptive analysis of the microstructure of the Tunisian financial market to highlight the degree of liquidity. In a second step, we study the relationship between liquidity and firm performance. We propose in the third chapter a presentation of models operating the link between liquidity and value firm through the ownership structure. We are also interested in this chapter to the impact of liquidity cost on the performance and value of companies. The contribution of the service cost of immediacy translates into an additional discount on the cost of capital and the value of companies. In the fourth chapter, we conduct a comprehensive study of the influence of the liquidity of Tunisian companies on their performance. In a third step, we study the impact of ownership structure on liquidity. This part includes two chapters. The fifth chapter is devoted to the development of assumptions made in explaining the link between ownership concentration and liquidity. In the sixth chapter, we test our research hypotheses on the influence of the characteristics of the structure of corporate ownership on the stock liquidity.

This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay focuses on idiosyncratic volatility as a primary arbitrage cost for short sellers. Previous studies document (i) negative abnormal returns for high relative short interest (RSI) stocks, and (ii) positive abnormal returns for low RSI stocks. We examine whether these market inefficiencies can be explained by arbitrage limitations, especially firms' idiosyncratic risk. Consistent with limits to arbitrage hypothesis, we document an abnormal return of -1.74% per month for high RSI stocks (>=95th percentile) with high idiosyncratic volatility. However, for similar level of high RSI, abnormal returns are economically and statistically insignificant for stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. For stocks with low RSI, the returns are positively related to idiosyncratic volatility. These results imply that idiosyncratic risk is a potential reason for the inability of arbitrageurs to extract returns from high and low RSI portfolios. The second essay investigates market efficiency in the absence of limits to arbitrage on short selling. Theoretical predictions and empirical results are ambiguous about the effect of short sale constraints on security prices. Since these constraints cannot be eliminated in equity markets, we use trades from futures markets where there is no distinction between short and long positions. With no external constraints on short positions, we document a weekend effect in futures markets which is a result of asymmetric risk between long and short positions around weekends. The premium is higher in periods of high volatility when short sellers are unwilling to accept higher levels of risk. On the other hand, riskiness of long positions does not seem to have a similar impact on prices. The third essay studies investor behaviors that generate mispricing by examining relationship between stock price and future returns. Based on traditional finance theory, valuation should not depend on nominal stock prices. However, recent literature documents that preference of retail investors for low price stocks results in their overvaluation. Motivated by this preference, we re-examine the relationship between stock price and expected return for the entire U.S. stock market. We find that stock price and expected returns are positively related if price is not confounded with size. Results in this paper show that, controlled for size, high price stocks significantly outperform low price stocks by an abnormal 0.40% per month. This return premium is attributed to individual investors' preference for low price stocks. Consistent with costly arbitrage, the return differential between high and low price stocks is highest for the stocks which are difficulty to arbitrage. The results are robust to price cut-off of $5, and in different sub-periods. / Ph. D.