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The purpose of this thesis is to increase the understanding of how senior management executives experience insider ownership. An additional aim is to investigate if there is a difference of the experiences of senior management executives with a Swedish cultural background in comparison to the experiences of senior management executives with other cultural backgrounds, with regards to insider ownership. By distribution of a questionnaire, partly through telephone interviews and in part via email, empirical primary data is gathered. The empirical findings indicate that insider ownership has a broad area of use and that senior management executives experience insider ownership as a source of motivation. Further, the study indicates that insider ownership is experienced as a motivational source regardless of cultural background since the study sees tendencies of that personal characteristics outweigh the cultural permeation. The findings of this study imply tendencies that show many different positive effects of insider ownership. For example, insider ownership could be a motivational source, a governance tool for creating trust among employees and other interlinked stakeholders. This could in turn mean that insider ownership contributes to a more cooperative working environment. Also, insider ownership has been portrayed as a possible catalyst for increased motivation. Thus, insider ownership could be a source for increased individual performance, and thus, company performance. Additionally, one of the major findings of this study is the tendencies that could prove to be of interest for future research, for example; that the feeling of fear might be superior to the feeling of greed

Cette thèse analyse le lien entre la gouvernance d'entreprise et la liquidité par une validation empirique sur un échantillon d'entreprises cotées sur le marché boursier tunisien. Ce choix est motivé par le fait que les différences dans les systèmes de gouvernance entre les pays dans plusieurs aspects (concentration de la propriété, identité des actionnaires…) pourraient avoir des effets différents sur la liquidité des titres. Plus spécifiquement, nous nous proposons d'étudier, l'effet d'un mécanisme de gouvernance interne sur le coût de liquidité pour en déduire l'impact sur le coût du capital et par la suite la performance espérée des firmes. Dans un premier temps, nous appréhendons le concept de liquidité et mesurons son degré. Dans un deuxième temps, nous étudions la relation entre la liquidité et la performance des entreprises. La contribution du coût du service d'immédiateté se traduit par un escompte additionnel sur le coût du capital et la valeur des sociétés. Les résultats trouvés montrent que les fourchettes de prix sont reliées positivement à la rentabilité des fonds propres en valeur de marché. Ces résultats confirment que les entreprises les moins liquides doivent suggérer une rentabilité supérieure aux investisseurs (une prime d'illiquidité) afin de compenser la ponction des coûts de transactions sur la rentabilité de leurs portefeuilles. Enfin, nous constatons que la liquidité est un facteur non négligeable dans le domaine de la gouvernance d'entreprise dans la mesure où les grands actionnaires affectent négativement la liquidité des titres de l'entreprise. Nos résultats concluent à des implications différentes quant à l'identité des actionnaires. Les insiders augmentent les coûts de liquidité en raison de leur accès à l'information privée et pertinente. De même, une participation institutionnelle dans l'entreprise réduit la liquidité de ses titres mesurée par l'impact sur les prix. / This thesis analyzes the link between corporate governance and liquidity by an empirical validation on a sample of companies listed on the Tunisian stock market. We propose in the first chapter an overview of theoretical models and empirical concept of liquidity. In the second chapter, we are a part, an empirical study on stock liquidity in our sample, performing a descriptive analysis of the microstructure of the Tunisian financial market to highlight the degree of liquidity. In a second step, we study the relationship between liquidity and firm performance. We propose in the third chapter a presentation of models operating the link between liquidity and value firm through the ownership structure. We are also interested in this chapter to the impact of liquidity cost on the performance and value of companies. The contribution of the service cost of immediacy translates into an additional discount on the cost of capital and the value of companies. In the fourth chapter, we conduct a comprehensive study of the influence of the liquidity of Tunisian companies on their performance. In a third step, we study the impact of ownership structure on liquidity. This part includes two chapters. The fifth chapter is devoted to the development of assumptions made in explaining the link between ownership concentration and liquidity. In the sixth chapter, we test our research hypotheses on the influence of the characteristics of the structure of corporate ownership on the stock liquidity.

Bakgrund: På senare år har Pilotskolan blivit ett hett samtalsämne inom aktieanalys. Pilotskolan definieras av att ledande befattningshavare äger en betydande del av aktierna i bolaget, således bidrar ledningen med ett ekonomiskt engagemang och anses vara ett incitament för värdemaximering för bolagets aktieägare. Tidigare forskning är oense om större insiderägande har en positiv eller negativ effekt på avkastning Däremot råder det en avsaknad av tidigare forskning kring fenomenet i en svensk kontext. Därför är det av stort intresse att undersöka hur sambandet mellan VD-ägande och historisk avkastning faktiskt ser ut. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan insiderägande i form av VD-ägande och historisk avkastning för bolag noterade på Stockholmsbörsen (OMXSPI) under tidsperioden 2016-12-31 – 2021-12-31. Metod: Studien har använt sig av en kvantitativ forskningsstrategi med en deduktiv ansats. Det slutgiltiga urvalet analyserades med hjälp av variabler som har sin grund i teoretiskt etablerad effekt på aktieavkastning. Studien använde sig av balanserade paneldata och resultatet har producerats med hjälp av panelregressioner. Resultat: Studiens slutgiltiga panelregression visade på ett starkt positivt signifikant samband mellan VD-ägande och avkastning. Vidare visade resultatet på att det positiva sambandet bara gäller upp till en viss nivå för att sedan ha en signifikant negativ påverkan på avkastningen. Resultatet är i linje med en del tidigare forskning inom ämnet som har gjorts på andra marknader. Författarna kunde därför utifrån resultatet fastställa att VD- ägande påverkar avkastningen i en svensk kontext och utvärdering av ägarstruktur bör därför vara en parameter vid bolagsanalyser. / Background: Pilot-school as a phenomenon has become a hot topic in stock analysis as of late. The Pilot-school is defined as senior executives owning a considerable amount of the shares in their company, where the management contributes with a financial commitment and is considered an incentive for maximizing shareholder value. Previous studies disagree on whether insider-ownership has a positive or negative effect on stock- returns. However, there is a lack of research within the field in a Swedish context. Accordingly, it is of great interest to examine the actual relationship between CEO- ownership and historical stock-returns. Aim: The aim of this study is to examine if there exists a relationship between insider- ownership in form of CEO-ownership and historical stock-returns on companies listed on the OMXSPI during the period 2016-12-31 – 2021-12-31. Methodology: The study has utilized a quantitative research strategy with a deductive approach. The final selection was analyzed using variables with theoretically established effects on stock-returns. The study used balanced panel data and the result was produced with the aid of multiple panel regression. Results: The final panel regression model exhibited a strong positive significant relationship between CEO-ownership and stock-returns. Additionally, the results showed that the positive relationship is applicable only up to a certain level and after that level CEO-ownership has a significant negative relationship with stock-returns. The results are in line with some previous studies within the field. The authors could therefore establish that CEO-ownership affects stock-returns and an evaluation of ownership structure should be a parameter when performing a company analysis.

Syfte: Då tidigare forskning har visat varierande och motsägelsefulla resultat vad gäller relationen mellan CSP och finansiell prestation, skapar det en förståelse för att andra variabler påverkar relationen. Syftet med följande studie är att undersöka om och hur graden av internt ägande påverkar relationen mellan socialt ansvar och finansiell prestation.   Metod: Denna studie har utifrån en positivistisk forskningsfilosofi, med en deduktiv ansats, antagit en kvantitativ forskningsstrategi. En tvärsnittsdesign har utförts där enbart sekundärdata har tillämpats som hämtats från Thomson Reuters Datastream. Analysering av sekundärdata har utförts genom deskriptiv statistik och multipla regressionsanalyser i statistikprogrammet SPSS.   Resultat & slutsats: Resultatet indikerar att det inte är möjligt att visa hur graden av internt ägande påverkar relationen mellan socialt ansvar och finansiell prestation. Studien visar däremot att det föreligger en negativ relation mellan företags arbete med socialt ansvar och finansiell prestation (ROA och Tobin’s Q), samt mellan socialt ansvar och internt ägande.   Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag till framtida forskning är framförallt att fortsätta på den nya unika forskningsinriktningen som följande studie belyst, genom att studera hur graden av internt ägande påverkar relationen mellan CSR och finansiell prestation (läs fler förslag under avsnitt 6.5 Förslag till vidare forskning).   Uppsatsens bidrag: Studien bidrar med mer empiriskt material till variationerna som tidigare forskning framställt gällande relationen mellan CSP och finansiell prestation, samt relationen mellan internt ägande och CSP. Studien har även bidragit till en ny forskningsinriktning gällande de interna ägarnas påverkan på relationen mellan socialt ansvar och finansiell prestation. / Purpose: Since previous research has shown diverse and contradictory results regarding the relationship between CSP and financial performance, it creates an understanding that other variables may affect the relationship. The purpose of the study is to examine whether and how the level of insider ownership affects the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance.   Method: This study was based on a positivistic research philosophy, with a deductive approach and adopted a quantitative research strategy. A cross-sectional design has been carried out using only secondary data that was collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The secondary data was analyzed by descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis in SPSS.   Results & Conclusions: The result wasn’t able to show how the level of insider ownership affects the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance. However, the study showed that there is a negative relationship between the social responsibility and financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q), as well as between social responsibility and insider ownership.   Suggestions for further research: Suggestions submitted to future research is to continue on the new unique research approach that this study has shed light on, by studying how the level of insider ownership affects the relationship between CSR and financial performance (read more suggestions under section 6.5 Suggestions for further research).   Contributions of the thesis: The study provides more empirical data to the varying results that previous researchers has shown in attempt to examine the relationship between CSP and financial performance, and the relationship between insider ownership and CSP. The study has also contributed to a new research area regarding the insider ownership and how they influence the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance.

This dissertation consists of three essays examining the relation between corporate governance and firm performance. The theme of this study is that the widely documented long-term underperformance in equity carve-outs can be partly explained by weak corporate governance. The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the performance of a sample of firms that initiated a carve-out during the period 1983-2004. Using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) entrenchment index, as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide evidence that firms with better shareholder rights protection outperform those with weaker rights protection. Results indicate that the weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of underperformance. Overall, the results are robust to measures of firm performance and to model specification. The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between firm performance and board structure. In particular, I study how board size, board independence, and CEO duality influence firm performance. I find that board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but positively associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to firm performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and non-financial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. The conflicting evidence on board size, between financials and non-financials, seems to suggest that the scope and complexity of a firm.s operations drives board size. The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates corporate ownership and firm performance. I focus on insider ownership, outside blockholder ownership, and ownership concentration. Results show that insider ownership is negatively related to firm performance even at low levels of insider ownership levels. It is plausible that the combination of parent ownership and management ownership in the subsidiary exacerbate the entrenchment effect thus overwhelming the incentive alignment effects that theory posits. I document a positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. And finally, I show that the level of ownership concentration increases (decreases) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm performance.

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.