Thesis (M. Com. (Accountancy))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Accountancy, 2014 / Academic and commercial interest in the corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies has increased significantly in recent years (Rossouw, 2005). With high-profile corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom heightening the interest in corporate governance practices (Rashid, 2011). It has become evident that the performance of well governed firms is superior to that of less well governed firms (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Despite the fact that corporate governance is multi-dimensional (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005), this study focused on the impact of board composition (defined by the percentage representation of independent non-executive directors on the board) and board size on the firm performance measures namely; Tobin’s Q (TOB), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) of firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Annual data, from the period 2006 to 2012 was used while the analysis of data was done using the Multiple Regression Analysis Model. After having analysed the research results, it was found that no significant relationship exists between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board and board size, and firm performance measures. Thus, this research study suggests that performance of South African companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange is not influenced by board composition and board size.

<p>This paper tries to find the relationship between the compensation given to the chief executive officer and the performance of the company. Further, it tries to determine the influence of the size of the Board members on the pay scale of the executive. The data consisted of the largest thirty companies in Sweden for the period of 2004-2008. After controlling for firm size and growth opportunities, I find a negative and insignificant relationship between pay and performance. Contradictory to previous studies no correlation between large board size and chief executive officers compensation was found. This paper adds more empirical evidence to the idea of chief executives pay being independent of his performance.</p>

This paper tries to find the relationship between the compensation given to the chief executive officer and the performance of the company. Further, it tries to determine the influence of the size of the Board members on the pay scale of the executive. The data consisted of the largest thirty companies in Sweden for the period of 2004-2008. After controlling for firm size and growth opportunities, I find a negative and insignificant relationship between pay and performance. Contradictory to previous studies no correlation between large board size and chief executive officers compensation was found. This paper adds more empirical evidence to the idea of chief executives pay being independent of his performance.

In this study, we examine the impact of political factors in corporate governance on the performance of firm. The major difference between this study and other corporate governance studies is use of three stage least square method, which can estimate the cause and effect between endogenous variable. Our sample consists of 100 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that the political directors harm the performance of firm.

This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America. This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were related to firm value. Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to 2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous research by reporting no relationship between these variables. This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. . Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and Mexico.

The well documented agency problem remains an ongoing debate, with the board as a central point of corporate governance providing a control mechanism. The effective composition and functioning of the board is therefore highlighted as being key to overcoming agency‐problems (Hermalin and Weisback, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This research report explores the relationship between the structural aspects of the board, including the average age of board members, the size of the board of directors and the specific positions women and ethnic persons hold on the board of South African listed companies, and intellectual capital performance measured using VAIC™ (Pulic, 2000), as well as market adjusted share returns. The population consists of all South African companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange during 2011 with the final sample consisting of 193 companies after transformation of the data. The results of the regression analyses indicated no significant relationship between intellectual capital performance and board size, or specific positions being held by women or ethnic persons. A significant positive relationship however exists between the average age of the board of directors and intellectual capital performance. As a result, companies may be able to enhance their intellectual capital performance by increasing the average age of their board members. Key words: Board structure, Diversity, Ethnic, Gender, Age, Board size, Intellectual capital, Performance, South Africa.

A firm’s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price fixing agreements. This study aims to identify which characteristics of the participating firms’ boards of directors and CEOs are associated with cartel formation. It analyses the empirical investigation of cartel participation of firms, taking into account corporate governance characteristics as such as board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, CEO characteristics, and CEO compensation scheme. The study is focused on UK cartel firms which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. The challenge of this study is that the personal attributes of CEOs and boards can make a significant contribution to the risk profile of a cartel being formed. This indeed would be to ‘diagnose’ organisational culture in a quite radical direction. The study suggests and finds that some corporate governance attributes are associated with cartel formation. The results reveal consistency with prior researches, that cartel firms have different corporate governance relative to a control sample in the three years prior to cartel formation. Specifically, the study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages.

Corporate governance (CG) is a popular topic that gets more concerns today, especially infast developing countries. Numbers of projects and studies relating to CG and their effectson financial performance of companies have been done in many countries, but still this kindof topic is quite new in Vietnam.This paper tries to find out if there is any relationship between board size &amp; composition,board activity, and ownership concentration and firm performances. Based on collectinginformation of listed companies in Vietnam, I use statistical analysis and quantitativemethod to get the paper’s objectives.Based on CG theory and the role of CG structures such as board of directors, ownershipstructure, and this paper also make a review on the compliance of listed companies with CGrules at Vietnamese market recently.Our empirical findings show that independent directors enhanced firm performance;inversely, the dual position of CEO and Chairman has a positive relation with firm value.Besides, age of director and the number of directors meeting play important roles in firmvalue. However, no significant impact of board size, board gender diversity, top tenshareholders concentration and levels of state ownership on firm performance. Lastly,regression model of market performance shows that the duality of CEO and Chairman andthe number of independent directors are significant impact on firm value.

This study investigates the effect of board size on firm performance measured through return on assets. Furthermore, this study investigates how this relationship is influenced by uncertainty avoidance. An unbalanced global sample of more than 9,000 observations divided over 23 countries for the time period 2006 – 2016 is used to examine this. In contrast with other studies a global sample is used and a new variable, uncertainty avoidance is added. In the study, I find that board size positively affects firm performance. Furthermore, I find that uncertainty avoidance affects the relationship between board size and firm performance. Although in contrast with other studies, my evidence supports the argument that firms should increase their board size to reduce agency costs and increase board capital.

This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America. This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were related to firm value. Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to 2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous research by reporting no relationship between these variables. This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. . Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and Mexico.