This dissertation consists of three chapters covering the following topics in firm value and volatility: valuation of agency cost, valuation of the underpricing in IPOs and the idiosyncratic volatility of public firms. In Chapter 1, I briefly introduce three topics studied in my dissertation. In addition, I summarized the stochastic frontier model which is employed in the study of valuation of agency cost and the underpricing in IPOs. In Chapter 2, I extend the agency cost literature multifold. First, by using the data of the 1,500 S&P Super Composite Index Constituents for 1994-2011, I estimate firm-level agency cost and the uncertainty in firm's maximum benchmark value, respectively, as the mean and variance of the inefficiency term conditional on the composed error. The estimation results reveal that, on average, a sample firm is around 18% and 15% below its optimal value for the period 1994-2006 and 2007-2011 respectively. The variances of the inefficiency term are 0.01 and 0.001 for two periods respectively. Second, using this measure of uncertainty, I construct the confidence interval for the agency cost of each firm. Third, a new concept called Coefficient of Uncertainty of Market Value due to the principal-agent problem (CUMV) is defined and calculated, which measures uncertainty in the benchmark value per unit of agency cost. Finally, I decompose the change in market value of a firm into three components, i.e. change due to agency cost; change due to operational efficiency, and change due to the evaluation of the whole market (called the market effect). I find that the reduction of agency cost and the expansion of the whole market do contribute to firm growth, but the majority of the growth for the sample firms is explained by the improvement of firms' operational efficiency. In chapter 3, I estimate the magnitude of the underpricing of the initial public offering (IPO) for 338 firms during 2001-2010 under the framework of Stochastic Frontier Approach. The magnitude of the underpricing in IPOs and the uncertainty in IPOs' maximum benchmark value are estimated as the mean and variance of the inefficiency term conditional on the composed error respectively. I note that the new issues of a firm with initial offering in US between 2001 and 2010, on average, fall short of 22.9% of their optimal value with a variance of 0.63. As an extension of existing literature, I do not only estimate the frontier model, but investigate the determinants of the underpricing of the IPOs. The estimation results support the fact that the underpricing would be lower if the firms have more reputable underwriters, more insider ownership and higher age at the time of offering new issues. Finally, I introduce a new concept, the Coefficient of Uncertainty of Firm Value due to the underpricing in the IPOs (CUV), which reports the firm value uncertainty for each unit of the underpricing in IPOs. I observe that, on average, the CUV is 4.21 for a sample firm, which implies that firm's uncertainty is indeed sensitive to the underpricing in IPOs. In chapter 4, I investigate the idiosyncratic volatility and its relation to executive ownership during 1992 to 2011. The ownership of executives is employed as the proxy for the behavior of executives to study how executives influence firms' idiosyncratic volatility. Inconsistent with the previous literature, I don't find upward trend of the aggregated idiosyncratic volatility during 1992 to 2011. Instead, I observe that the aggregated idiosyncratic volatility exhibits indeterministic pattern during this period. Moreover, I also note that the reverts of aggregated idiosyncratic volatility occur at a time of the US stock market crash in 2000 and the period of most recent recession (2008-2009). The most interesting finding of this study is that although the idiosyncratic volatility increases in executives' ownership, the idiosyncratic volatility's growth rate is not always positive related with executives' ownership. In Chapter 5, I conclude this dissertation.

This thesis consists of three main empirical chapters on the effect of stock liquidity on exchange markets. The first (Chapter 2) investigates the pricing ability of an illiquidity measure, namely the Amihud measure (Amihud, 2002), in different sample periods. The second (Chapter 3) determines the causal link between two well-known market quality factors liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility adopting two-stage least squares methodology (2SLS). The last empirical chapter (Chapter 4) revisits the limits to arbitrage theory and studies the link between stock liquidity and momentum anomaly profit, employing the difference-in-differences approach. The overall contribution of this thesis is to employ causal techniques in the context of asset pricing in order to eliminate potential endogeneity problems while investigating the relation between stock liquidity and exchange markets. Chapter 2 investigates whether the Amihud measure is priced differently if the investor is optimistic or, conversely, pessimistic about the future of the stock markets. The results of the chapter show that Amihud measure is priced in the low-sentiment period and that there is illiquidity premium when investor sentiment is low. Chapter 3 studies whether a change in stock liquidity has an impact on idiosyncratic volatility, employing causal techniques. Prior studies investigate the link between liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility but none focus on the potential problem of reverse causality. To overcome this reverse causality problem, I use the exogenous event of decimalisation as an instrumental variable and employ two-stage least squares approach to identify the impact of liquidity on idiosyncratic volatility. The results of the chapter suggest that an increase in illiquidity causes an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. As an additional result, my study shows that reduction in the tick size as a result of decimalisation improves firm-level stock liquidity. Chapter 4 examines whether liquid stocks earn more momentum anomaly profits compare to illiquid stocks, using the implementation of different tick sizes for different price ranges in the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) between February 1995 and April 1997. This programme provides a plausibly exogenous variation to disentangle the endogeneity issue and allows me to examine the impact of liquidity on momentum, by clearly exploiting the difference-in-difference framework. The results of the chapter show that liquid stocks earn more momentum profit than illiquid stocks.

<p>This dissertation consists of three essays on asymmetric correlations in financial markets. In the first essay, I have two main contributions. First, I show that dividend growth rates have symmetric correlations. Second, I show that asymmetric correlations are different than correlations being counter-cyclical. The correlation asymmetry I study in this dissertation should not be confused with correlations being counter-cyclical, i.e. being higher during recessions than during booms. I show that while counter-cyclical correlations can simply be explained by counter-cyclical aggregate market volatility, the correlation asymmetry with respect to joint upside and downside movements of returns are not just due to the heightened market volatility during those times. </p><p>In the second essay I present a model in order to explain the correlation asymmetry observed in the data. This is the first paper to offer an explanation for observed correlation asymmetry. I formalize the explanation using an equilibrium model. The model is useful to understand both the cross-section and time-series of correlation asymmetry. By the means of my model, we can answer questions about why some stocks have higher correlation asymmetry, and why the correlation asymmetry was higher during 1990s? In the model asset prices respond the realization of dividends and news about the future. However, price responses to news are asymmetric and this asymmetry is endogenous. Price responses are endogenously stronger conditional on bad news than conditional on good news. This asymmetry also generates the observed correlation asymmetry. The price responses are asymmetric due to the ambiguity about the news quality. Information about the quality of the signal is incomplete in the sense that the exact precision of the signal is unknown; it is only known to be in an interval, which makes the representative agent treat news as ambiguous. To model ambiguity aversion, I use Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)'s max-min expected utility representation. The agent has a set of beliefs about the quality of signals, and the ambiguity-averse agent behaves as if she maximizes expected utility under a worst-case scenario. This incomplete information about the news quality, together with ambiguity-averse agents, generates an asymmetric response to news. Endogenous worst-case scenarios differ depending on the realization of news. When observing ``bad" news, the worst-case scenario is that the news is reliable and the prices of trees decrease strongly. On the other hand, when ``good news" is observed, under the worst-case scenario the news is evaluated as less reliable, and thus the price increases are mild. Therefore, price responses are stronger conditional on a negative signal and this asymmetry creates a higher correlation conditional on a negative signal than conditional on a positive signal. I also show that the results are robust to the smooth ambiguity aversion representation.</p><p>Motivated by the model, I uncover a new empirical regularity that is unknown in the literature. I show that correlation asymmetry is related to idiosyncratic volatility: the higher the idiosyncratic volatility, the higher the correlation asymmetry. This novel empirical finding is also useful to understand the time-series and cross-sectional variation in correlation asymmetry. Stocks with smaller market capitalizations have greater correlation asymmetry compared to stocks with higher market capitalization. However, an explanation for this finding has been lacking. According to the explanation offered in this paper, smaller size stocks have greater correlation asymmetry compared to bigger size stocks because small size stocks tend to have higher idiosyncratic volatilities compared to bigger size stocks. In the time-series, correlation asymmetry shows quite significant variation as well. The average correlation asymmetry is especially high for the 1990s and decreases significantly at the beginning of the 2000s. This pattern in times-series can also be explained in terms of the time-series behavior of idiosyncratic volatilities. Several papers including Brandt et al. (2010), document higher idiosyncratic volatilities during 1990s while the aggregate volatility stays fairly stable. Basically, the high idiosyncratic volatilities during the 1990s also caused greater correlation asymmetry. </p><p>In the third essay, I study the correlation of returns in government bond markets. Similar to the findings in equity markets, I show that there is some evidence for asymmetric correlations in government bond markets. First, I show that the maturity structure matters for correlation asymmetry in bonds markets: Unlike long-maturity bonds, shorter-maturity bonds tend to have asymmetric correlations. Second, I show that the correlation asymmetry observed in European bond markets disappears with the formation of a common currency area. Lastly, I study the correlation between equity and bond returns in different countries. For long-maturity bonds, correlations with the domestic equity returns are asymmetric for half of the countries in the sample, including the U.S. These findings show that results on asymmetric correlations from equity markets can generalize, at least to some extent, to other financial markets.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis examines the return volatility of Hong Kong stock market on the firm-level, industry-level, and market-level during a fifteen year sample period between 1991 and 2005. The identified patterns of stock return volatilities contribute to the understanding of an important Asian market.

This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter examines the role of growth options on stock return continuation. Growth options are both difficult to value and risky. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that higher momentum profits earned by high market-to-book firms stem from investors' higher overconfidence due to the difficulty of valuing growth options. Johnson (2002) and Sagi and Seasholes (2007) offer an alternative rational explanation wherein growth options cause a wider spread in risk and expected returns between winners and losers. This paper suggests that firm-specific uncertainty helps disentangle these two different explanations. Specifically, the rational explanation is at work among firms with low firm specific uncertainty. However, the evidence is in favor of the behavioral explanation for firms with high firm specific uncertainty. This is consistent with the notion that investors are more prone to behavioral biases in the presence of firm-specific uncertainty and the resulting mispricings are less likely to be arbitraged away. The second chapter examines how investors capitalize differences of opinion when disagreements are common knowledge. We conduct an event study of the market's reaction to analysts' dispersed earnings forecast revisions. We find that investors take differences of opinion into account and do not exhibit an optimism bias. Our findings indicate that the overpricing of stocks with high forecast dispersion is not due to investors' tendency to overweight optimistic expectations, but rather due to investor credulity regarding analysts' incentives. Our findings support the notion that assets may become mispriced when rational investors face structural uncertainties as proposed by Brav and Heaton (2002). / Ph. D.

Motivated by the recent evidence of investors' preference for stocks with lottery- type payoffs documented on the U.S. stock markets, I investigate preferences for stocks that appear to be like lotteries in Europe. Across 14 markets, lottery- type stocks, characterized by high idiosyncratic skewness, high idiosyncratic volatility and low price, underperform and exhibit a "lottery premium". Fur- thermore, preferences for lottery-type stocks can help to explain the puzzling negative relation between past idiosyncratic volatility and returns, which does not persist after controlling for past extreme positive returns. Examining the relation between national revenues from gambling and "lottery premium" I find that countries featuring higher gambling revenues also exhibit a higher "lottery premium". Overall, the results indicate that lottery preferences might impact investment decisions and stock prices. JEL Classification G11, G12 Keywords gambling, lottery-type stocks, idiosyncratic volatility, maximum returns Author's e-mail p.vokata@gmail.com Supervisor's e-mail novakji@fsv.cuni.cz

I examine the informational efficiency of stock markets by testing the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing. I find that the level of mispricing declines with idiosyncratic volatility consistent with the notion that greater levels of firm-specific risk reflect greater participation of informed traders in the market for the stock. However, I also find that mispricing increases with idiosyncratic volatility for highly volatile stocks, and this is attributed to both noise trading and arbitrage risk. In addition, I investigate the link between agency costs and equity mispricing, and whether it exists due to information asymmetry or the degree of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. I provide evidence that the level of agency costs is positively related with mispricing. In contrast to previous studies' claim that the information asymmetry level is a key determinant in the equity mispricing, I find that the conflict of interests is more important than information asymmetry in explaining equity mispricing. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that stock option grants, originally intended to resolve conflicts of interests, actually exaggerate this problem.

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This Dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay studies the causal impacts of compensation disclosure on executive compensation, turnover, and executives’ job responsibilities. We find that, after the SEC mandates the disclosure of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)’ compensation in 2006, CFO pay increases significantly relative to CEO pay, particularly in firms most affected by the mandate. CFOs are more likely to leave their firms following poor performance. The results are absent for the CEO or other executives, suggesting they are unique outcomes of enhanced CFO compensation disclosures. The evidence is consistent with more intense monitoring following the disclosure mandate. CFOs require additional compensation for the loss of private benefits due to greater monitoring and are subject to greater internal discipline. There is also some evidence that the CFOs hide bad news and lower corporate reporting quality after the mandate, suggesting that CFOs engage in more short-term behavior to boost their performance and avoid termination. The second essay of my dissertation focuses on the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle - the negative relation between estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the subsequent month returns documented by Ang et al (2006). We document a systematic pattern of temporary increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility for the quintile of stocks with the highest estimated idiosyncratic volatility in a given month. A large portion of this temporary increase in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility is reversed in the subsequent month. This temporary increase in the idiosyncratic volatility for the quintile of stocks with the highest estimated idiosyncratic volatility is associated with relatively large positive returns (positive abnormal returns) in the estimation month and relatively low returns (negative abnormal returns) in the subsequent month. Our evidence shows that these temporary increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the related positive and negative abnormal returns in the estimation and subsequent months, respectively, create a negative relation between the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month returns documented in the prior literature (Ang et al. 2006). We find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent returns for eighty percent of the stocks that do not exhibit large changes in idiosyncratic volatility despite large differences in the levels of their idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, there is no relation between the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent returns after a lag of 3 months when the abnormal returns associated with temporary changes are no longer present. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that there is no relation between the true underlying idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns, and that the previously documented negative relation between estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month’s returns is being driven by temporary one-month increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the associated abnormal returns for a subset of stocks. / Ph. D. / The disclosure of executive compensation is an important issue because it affects the investors’ ability to monitor the firms’ compensation practices. Properly designed compensation contracts, in turn, incentivize the executives to make decisions that serve the investors’ interests. The SEC has made continuous regulatory efforts to monitor the executive compensation and has adopted several disclosure rules. However, the impacts of such enhanced compensation disclosure has not been well understood. My first essay studies the impacts of compensation disclosure on executive compensation, turnover, and executives’ job responsibilities. We find that, after the SEC mandates the disclosure of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)’ compensation in 2006, CFO pay increases significantly relative to CEO pay, particularly in firms most affected by the mandate. CFOs are more likely to leave their firms following poor performance. There is also some evidence that the CFOs hide bad news and lower corporate reporting quality after the mandate, suggesting that CFOs engage in more short-term behavior to boost their performance and avoid termination. Traditional asset pricing models in which investors hold well-diversified portfolios imply that there should be no relation between firm specific risk (the idiosyncratic volatility) and the expected returns. However, Ang et al (2006) document that stocks with high firm specific risks earn low subsequent returns. The significant negative relation between firm specific risk and subsequent returns has puzzled many researchers. The second essay of my dissertation provides a possible resolution to this puzzle.