No description available.

The study was conducted at an organization that experienced a change of corporate ownership. The organization that underwent the change was part of an international company. After the buy-out, the organization became a part of another company, which also is established on the international market. This study aims to explain what composes the socialization process of employees during an organizational change of this kind. During organizational change employees undergo a process of socialization to create an understanding of the new structure that the change brings. The study aims to identify the key elements that compose employee’s socialization process. To identify the key elements a method based on interviews with nine employees was applied. The theoretical perspectives applied on the study were Internalization, Objectification & Externalization (Berger & Luckmann 1966), Sensemaking (Omar, Davis-Sramek, Fugate och Mentzer 2012, & Van Maanen, 1978 & Whelan- Berry, Gordon & Hinings, 2003) and two of the theoretical findings, Hangover and Group Exit (Ebaugh, 1988). The findings reveal five key elements, which make up the socialization process. The key elements are: Information, Expectation, Encouragement, Method of work and Conversation. Employees need explicit and accurate information about what the change entails. They also need to know what is expected of them and the kind of behavior that the organization promotes. Employees are also in need of knowing the specific method of work the organization advocates. The last key element employee’s need is various forms of interaction with colleagues.

Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm adopts. This thesis provides an empirical analysis of the effect of corporate ownership, together with other governance mechanisms on equity agency conflicts for the largest 500 Australian listed firms. The results from this analysis provide strong support for the view that equity agency costs are related to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between inside ownership and the proxies for agency costs. Further, the results demonstrate that other governance mechanisms, particularly board size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, are effective in improving the use of firm assets, yet they do not seem to restrain firm management from incurring excessive discretionary operating expenses. This thesis also extends the investigation of the corporate ownership-equity agency cost relation by focusing on the largest shareholder for 9,165 listed firms drawn from 43 countries around the world. The results suggest that cross-sectional variation in equity agency costs can be partly attributable to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. The type of the largest shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution, is also important in analysis of this relation. Further, debt financing, dividend policy and legal origin vary in their impact on the agency cost proxies. This thesis also investigates the interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy for 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries around the world. Consistent with previous studies, the results suggest that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited, or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions. Together, the results imply that equity agency costs vary with corporate ownership though this relation remains, of course, the subject of continuing investigation in finance. A major contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that corporate ownership, particularly the largest shareholder, plays a pivotal role in controlling agency costs. Accordingly, this suggests the following policy implication: by improving the legal environment and regulatory constraints imposed on large shareholders as well as legal protection for minority shareholders, the efficiency gains generated from large shareholder control can be translated into higher firm valuation to the benefit of all shareholders in the firm.

As individuals or families hold a substantial share of a firm at the cost of less diversified portfolio, they specialize their portfolio and have better inside information. Does the market marker react to this fact and maintain higher level of asymmetric information cost for such family-controlled firms? We analyze the bid-ask spread and the probability of informed trading (PIN) of Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with NYSE/AMEX to test this notion. We find that although the market maker maintains higher average spread, he does not form higher PIN for family-controlled firms when the entire day is considered as an event period. <p>The assumption of constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders during the day in Easley et al (1996b) is rejected in the two periods per day analysis. In addition, the notion of information event occurrence prior to the day in Easley et al (1996b) is consistently rejected as higher (non-statistically) probability of information events is found in the afternoon (second session) in the two (three) periods per day analyses, respectively. Based on these findings, we have serious doubts about any existing findings (including ours) of PIN based on one period per day. As such, we consider the possibility of several periods per day.<p>Though it remains an empirical question to choose how many periods should be considered, we find our results using two and three periods per day to be very interesting. We consistently reject the hypothesis that the PIN is higher for family-controlled firms. Since the market maker does not need to maintain high spread for firms with very high number of uninformed traders and very low number of informed traders, we do not perceive our findings to be either surprising or contradictory to the present literature. By developing a different formulation of PIN, we also show that this is empirically less than that developed by Easley et al (1996b).

As individuals or families hold a substantial share of a firm at the cost of less diversified portfolio, they specialize their portfolio and have better inside information. Does the market marker react to this fact and maintain higher level of asymmetric information cost for such family-controlled firms? We analyze the bid-ask spread and the probability of informed trading (PIN) of Canadian-based publicly traded firms cross-listed with NYSE/AMEX to test this notion. We find that although the market maker maintains higher average spread, he does not form higher PIN for family-controlled firms when the entire day is considered as an event period. <p>The assumption of constant arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders during the day in Easley et al (1996b) is rejected in the two periods per day analysis. In addition, the notion of information event occurrence prior to the day in Easley et al (1996b) is consistently rejected as higher (non-statistically) probability of information events is found in the afternoon (second session) in the two (three) periods per day analyses, respectively. Based on these findings, we have serious doubts about any existing findings (including ours) of PIN based on one period per day. As such, we consider the possibility of several periods per day.<p>Though it remains an empirical question to choose how many periods should be considered, we find our results using two and three periods per day to be very interesting. We consistently reject the hypothesis that the PIN is higher for family-controlled firms. Since the market maker does not need to maintain high spread for firms with very high number of uninformed traders and very low number of informed traders, we do not perceive our findings to be either surprising or contradictory to the present literature. By developing a different formulation of PIN, we also show that this is empirically less than that developed by Easley et al (1996b).

no / This paper investigates the impact of corporate ownership and control on the outcome of financial distress. It is argued that the likelihood of financial distress resulting in insolvency depends on whether firms have controllers, the type of controllers and their cash flow ownership. Using a sample of 484 UK firms, 81 of which filed for insolvency, we show that financially distressed firms with controllers are more likely to be insolvent than widely held firms, where the probability of insolvency is greater when controllers are family or financial institutions. However, the probability of insolvency reduces significantly as the controllers’ cash flow ownership increases beyond 10%

This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: separation of ownership and control. Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance. This study aims to examine the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the year of 2004, this study shows that European companies' ownership are highly concentrated with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company. Industrial companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners. On average, there is more than one large shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between ownership, control and firm performance. A significant non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed. Specifically, Tobin's Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08. The largest shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance. Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach. Direct control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found to be detrimental for firm performance. Firm performance can also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition's power. The impacts of ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry. Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies' institutional environments. Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration level. Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current ownership concentration, while higher last year's Tobin's Q could result in higher current ownership concentration. Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism for ownership. These elements should be taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented.

I analyze the impact that a Major League Baseball (MLB) team’s ownership structure has on its financial and on-the-field efficiency. Previous work has shown that ownership structure does have an impact on firm efficiency. In MLB, a team under the management of a corporate owner could have access to potential cost and revenue synergies that would otherwise be unavailable to a team with a private owner. These synergies should increase the financial efficiencies of corporately owned teams, which should translate to success on the field, as measured by on-the-field efficiency.

Este trabalho analisa a disciplina da remuneração dos administradores de sociedades por ações no direito brasileiro em cotejo com aquela do Reino Unido, sob a perspectiva da estrutura de propriedade do capital predominante em cada um desses países. Após um escorço histórico que ilustra o papel da sociedade por ações em mobilizar poupança popular, exploram-se os fatores que levaram à fragmentação da propriedade acionária no Reino Unido e analisa-se a ocorrência de tal fatores no Brasil. A seguir destacam-se as relações entre distribuição do capital (se concentrada ou dispersa) e administração societária, com especial ênfase a seus reflexos sobre a remuneração. Por fim investiga-se a disciplina da remuneração dos administradores de companhias no direito britânico e brasileiro, atentando-se para a adequação deste a um cenário em que sociedades de capital disperso passam a disputar espaço no mercado com sociedades de capital concentrado. Conclui-se que as mudanças pelas quais vem passando o mercado de capitais brasileiro nos últimos anos podem vir a exigir alterações no direito. / This thesis analyses the discipline of executive remuneration in Brazilian law as compared to that of British law and under the perspective of the prevailing capital ownership structure in each of these countries. After a brief historical illustration of the role of corporations in the mobilisation of public savings, the factors that produced the dispersion of shareholding in the United Kingdom are review and their occurrence in Brazil is analysed. The relationships between share ownership distribution (if concentrated or dispersed) and corporate governance are reviewed, with an emphasis on its effects over remuneration. Finally the discipline of executive remuneration in British and Brazilian law is investigated, considering the adequacy of the latter to a scenario in which dispersed capital companies share an space in market with concentrated capital companies. Conclusion is that the changes observed in the brazilian capital market in the last years may come to demand modifications in law.

Este trabalho analisa a disciplina da remuneração dos administradores de sociedades por ações no direito brasileiro em cotejo com aquela do Reino Unido, sob a perspectiva da estrutura de propriedade do capital predominante em cada um desses países. Após um escorço histórico que ilustra o papel da sociedade por ações em mobilizar poupança popular, exploram-se os fatores que levaram à fragmentação da propriedade acionária no Reino Unido e analisa-se a ocorrência de tal fatores no Brasil. A seguir destacam-se as relações entre distribuição do capital (se concentrada ou dispersa) e administração societária, com especial ênfase a seus reflexos sobre a remuneração. Por fim investiga-se a disciplina da remuneração dos administradores de companhias no direito britânico e brasileiro, atentando-se para a adequação deste a um cenário em que sociedades de capital disperso passam a disputar espaço no mercado com sociedades de capital concentrado. Conclui-se que as mudanças pelas quais vem passando o mercado de capitais brasileiro nos últimos anos podem vir a exigir alterações no direito. / This thesis analyses the discipline of executive remuneration in Brazilian law as compared to that of British law and under the perspective of the prevailing capital ownership structure in each of these countries. After a brief historical illustration of the role of corporations in the mobilisation of public savings, the factors that produced the dispersion of shareholding in the United Kingdom are review and their occurrence in Brazil is analysed. The relationships between share ownership distribution (if concentrated or dispersed) and corporate governance are reviewed, with an emphasis on its effects over remuneration. Finally the discipline of executive remuneration in British and Brazilian law is investigated, considering the adequacy of the latter to a scenario in which dispersed capital companies share an space in market with concentrated capital companies. Conclusion is that the changes observed in the brazilian capital market in the last years may come to demand modifications in law.