Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1050 |
Date | 20 April 2009 |
Creators | Sheredos, Benjamin |
Publisher | Digital Archive @ GSU |
Source Sets | Georgia State University |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Philosophy Theses |
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