abstract: This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Business Administration 2012
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:14921 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Contributors | Wu, Qingqing (Author), Bates, Thomas W (Advisor), Hertzel, Michael (Committee member), Lindsey, Laura (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 72 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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