The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries
management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization.
The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies
can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines
the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing
the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet
licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each
policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is
also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but
strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation.
The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries
by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort
subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies
are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and
to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in
the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of
side payments is inefficient.
The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and
a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for
the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate
the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is
unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries,
the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it
can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case
of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in
the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the
second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of
divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for
world fisheries. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/9971 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Ruseski, Gorazd |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 3938205 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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