Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rhode Island, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 152-156).

The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization. The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation. The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of side payments is inefficient. The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for world fisheries.

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The following three essays present an analysis that combines well-known models of fisheries management with contemporary theories of international trade and industrial organization. The general theme of the thesis is that countries' fisheries management policies can affect the strategic interaction between their fishing industries. The first essay examines the problem of noncooperative management of international fisheries by analyzing the strategic rent-shifting roles for such well-known national management policies as fleet licensing and effort subsidies. It is shown that the noncooperative equilibrium in each policy takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma with dissipated rents in the fishery. It is also shown that strategic effort subsidies can only lead to incomplete rent dissipation but strategic fleet licensing can lead to complete rent dissipation. The second essay develops a theory of cooperative management of international fisheries by considering negotiation between countries over the same fleet licensing and effort subsidy policies considered in the first essay. The outcomes of negotiation over these policies are compared to the corresponding noncooperative outcomes, on the one hand, and to the efficient outcome on the other. It is shown that negotiation over effort subsidies in the absence of side payments is efficient, but negotiation over fleet sizes in the absence of side payments is inefficient. The third essay develops a two-stage two-period model of a 'domestic' country and a 'foreign' country whose respective fishing industries harvest from separate fisheries for the same international market. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate the harvest by its fishing industry, but the harvest by the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries are considered. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce the biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce the economic degradation of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that international fisheries trade in the presence of divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for world fisheries. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

The Law of the Sea negotiation, which was instigated as a response to increased human activities at sea, was an international law making process. The negotiation has been described as the longest, most techncally complex, continuous negotiation attempted in modem times. It was attended by almost all states in the world and contained a series of complex and overlapping issues. It was a remarkably successful process in that it concluded with an agreement, which protagonists with different interests and objectives succeeded in producing after 27 years. This thesis analyses international relations and negotiation theories that relate to the Law of the Sea negotiation, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each body of theory. The work goes on to examine the most importnt aspets of the Law of the Sea negotiation, including why the negotiation started, the core issues and principal actors of the negotiation, the process up until 1980 when the draft Treaty was devised, the American rejection of the Treaty and the process which led to the final agreement of 1994. The work then looks at these individual aspects of the negotiation in the context of the examination of international relations theory and negotiation theory that relates to the Law of the Sea. The thesis concludes by proposing a model that explains the Law of the Sea negotiation. The model questions existing theory on the meaning of the state and states' status in international society.

Thesis (M. A.), Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998. / Bibliography: leaves 102-113.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1989. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [194]-207).

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 took effect on March 1, 1977. By this Act the United States extended its management over fisheries to 200 nautical miles from shore. Extended fishery jurisdiction was expected to promote industry development and expand the contribution of the fishing industry to the economies of the coastal regions. Benefits to the Pacific Coast groundfish industry have, however, been less than were expected when the Act was passed. A spatial equilibrium model was formulated for the broader United States interregional/international groundfish market. Two steps were involved: First, a system of simultaneous econometric equations was estimated for each of the three product forms—fresh and frozen cod, ocean perch, and flounder fillets. Second, regionalized forms of these equations were collapsed into simple equations and combined with transportation and storage costs in a larger mathematical programming model. The resulting quadratic programming (QP) problem was then solved (for each product) for the competitive equilibrium quantities demanded and supplied, prices, and product movements. Two objectives were achieved: A model was formulated that accounts for most of the relevant factors influencing the United States groundfish market; and the multiregional nature of this market was established. The estimated price and income elasticities were similar to those suggested by earlier studies, and the estimated product movements were consistent with survey data in the Pacific Northwest. The various policies evaluated in this study (using the spatial equilibrium model) suggest mixed blessings to the Pacific Coast groundfish industry. There is no evidence to suggest that harvesting some average quantities uniformly throughout the year would improve industry revenues. In general, increasing Pacific Coast landings by 30 percent (or more) would depress wholesale revenues but substantially increase fleet revenues. On the other hand, both wholesale and fleet revenues would increase if at least 80 percent of the increase in landings could be sold in markets outside the region. This suggests that an industry policy aimed at expanding landings on the Pacific Coast will improve revenues for all industry participants only if access to outside markets also takes place. / Graduation date: 1987

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 290-299).

This thesis evaluates the impact of the Canadian 200-mile fisheries zone from biological, economic and social perspectives. The factors and events leading to the 200-mile zone are examined. The Canadian management regime post-extension is described. Canada derived significant benefits from the 200-mile zone including increased management authority over a vast area with major fish resources, the displacement of foreign fisheries, the development of Canadian fisheries in areas and for species not previously utilized by Canada, and the opportunity to rebuild overfished fish stocks. However, various problems and constraints have led to continued fisheries instability. These include: (1) Natural resource variability, (2) The common property nature of the resource and resultant overcapacity, (3) Fluctuations in market conditions, (4) Heavy dependence on the fisheries in isolated coastal communities, and (5) Recurrent conflict among competing users and conflicting objectives for fisheries management. / Despite Canada's abundant marine fishery resources, various combinations of these factors have contributed to a recurrent boom-and-bust pattern in many marine fisheries. Extended jurisdiction did not provide a panacea for the problems of the fisheries sector. Continued periodic fluctuations in Canada's marine fisheries and demands for government assistance can be expected unless viable alternative economic opportunities can be developed in the coastal regions.