This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified
that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the
development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority.
In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NWUBOLOKA1/oai:dspace.nwu.ac.za:10394/10249 |
| Date | January 1986 |
| Creators | Fowler, Stuart |
| Source Sets | North-West University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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